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REMEDIES UNDER 42 U.S.C. SECTION 1985(3)
Action v. Gannon'
This case involved the use of 42 U.S.c. section 1985 (3)2 as the basis
for enjoining the disruption of predominantly white church services in
St. Louis, Missouri, by two human rights groups seeking to assert demands
on behalf of the black community.
Specifically, the defendants had disrupted four services at the St. Louis
Cathedral during June and July of 1969. On each occasion the members
of the defendant group entered the church building to present demands
and demonstrate.3 At the first demonstration, 29 members of defendant
Action entered the cathedral, passed out a notice of their demands, and
read the demands over an amplifier.4 The notice warned the parishioners
of Action's intention to conduct unannounced demonstrations for a six-
month period and warned those who did not want "to become involved
[to] take a six month leave-of-absence from the church." 5
Based on these facts the district court issued a permanent injunction
against continued demonstrations that would deny the parishioners their
constitutional rights to exercise freedom of religion, assembly, and the use
of parish property.6 Defendants appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, where the decision was affirmed, with some
narrowing of the injunction to protect the defendants' first amendment
rights.
On appeal, the main contention of the defendants was that 42 U.S.C.
section 1985 (3) could not be the basis of an injunction in this situation
because it does not apply to private conspiracies such as the one in issue,
but rather applies only to those conspiracies involving state action.8 The
court rejected this interpretation and held as follows:
1. 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971).
2. The pertinent provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3) (1970) are as follows:
If two or more persons in any State... conspire or go in disguise...
on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly
or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of
the laws, or of ecual privileges and immunities under the laws . . . in
any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons
engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the
object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or
property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of
a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have
an action for damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against
any one or more conspirators.
3. 450 F.2d at 1229-30.
4. Id. at 1229.
5. Id. at 1229 nA.
6. Gannon v. Action, 303 F. Supp. 1240 (E.D. Mo. 1969).
7. 450 F.2d at 1238 n.17.
8. Id. at 1281.
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1. Section 1985 (3) applies to private conspiracies motivated by a racial
animus.0
2. The defendants' first amendment rights were not violated by the
injunction, as narrowed on appeal, because these rights lose their protec-
tion when their exercise results in the "intolerable violation of the rights
of those engaged in worship."' 0
8. Injunctive relief was proper even though section 1985 (3) specifically
provides for an action for damages. 1
4. Section 1985(3) could constitutionally be applied because a source
of congressional power to legislate in the area exists. The court stated
that the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 1985(8) in Griffin v.
Breckenridge12 required that a source of congressional power to legislate
be found in each case. This source was found in section five of the four-
teenth amendment.'3 The court reasoned that since the fourteenth amend-
ment extended protection to first amendment rights that are threatened,
i.e., freedom of worship,14 the statute was constitutional in this situation
because section five of the fourteenth amendment allows Congress to en-
force this protection against private conspiracies.' 5
The Action court's interpretation of section 1985 (3) as applying to
private conspiracies to deprive a party of his civil rights is based on the
unanimous decision of the Supreme Court in Griffin v. Breckenridge.16
That case overruled Collins v. Hardyman,17 which had expressed the
previously prevailing view that section 1985 (3) should be construed to
apply only to conspiracies involving state action. Griffin reversed the dis-
missal of a suit for damages brought by black petitioners who alleged that
the white respondents had conspired to assault them while they were travel-
ing through Mississippi in a car. The complaint alleged that the con-
spiracy was to deprive petitioners of their constitutional rights, "including
rights to free speech, assembly, association, and movement, and the right
not to be enslaved."' 8 The Court held that section 1985 (8) reaches private
conspiracies that are based on a racially discriminatory animus.' 9 The
Court felt that this element of intent to deprive others of "equal enjoyment
or rights secured by the law to all"20 was added by the draftsmen to pre-
vent the statute from being interpreted as a "general federal tort law," 2'
and eliminated any constitutional obstacle to applying the statute where
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1233.
11. Id. at 1237.
12. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
13. Section five of the fourteenth amendment provides: "The Congress shall
have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
14. Section one of the fourteenth amendment protects the rights covered
by the first eight amendments to the Constitution, and at any rate, the first amend-
ment rights to freedom of religion and worship. 450 F.2d at 1233-34.
15. Id. at 1235.
16. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
17. 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
18. 403 U.S. at 88.
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no state action was involved. The Court summarized its position that state
action was not required by stating: "It is thus evident that all indicators-
text, companion provisions, and legislative history-point unwaveringly
to § 1985 (3)'s coverage of private conspiracies." 22
To support further its construction of the section, the Court pointed
out that other civil rights statutes enacted in the same period had been
broadly interpreted in recent decisions, and that the criminal counterpart
of the section, 18 U.S.C. section 241, had been interpreted to reach private
action in several cases. 23 The Court also pointed out that various parts of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871,24 the parent statute of section 1985 (3), other than
the part of section 1985 (3) under consideration, explicitly require some
form of state action. Therefore, the Court considered it unlikely that sec-
tion 1985 (3) was intended "simply to duplicate the coverage of one or
more of them."25
Based on this interpretation of section 1985 (3), the Court in Griffin
found the requisite power of Congress to enact legislation in this area in
the constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude, and in the
constitutional right to travel interstate, neither of which applies only to
state action.2 6 The Court continued its discussion of congressional power
by pointing out that it was not implying that there were no other bases:
since the power of Congress under section five of the fourteenth amendment
(the crucial question in Action) was not in issue, "there [was] no oc-
casion ... to trace out its constitutionally permissible periphery."27 Thus
Griffin indicated that section 1985 (3) can reach private conspiracies if a
congressional power to legislate is found in each situation. The court in
Action held that section five of the fourteenth amendment provided that
power.
The basis of the Action court's holding is twofold. First, the court
placed reliance on the recent Supreme Court decision in United States
v. Guest,2 8 which it interpreted as authority for construing section five of
the fourteenth amendment as giving Congress the power to pass legislation
concerning racially motivated, private conspiracies.29 Second, the court
adopted the view that the history surrounding the drafting and adoption
of the fourteenth amendment indicated that the rights encompassed by
its provisions30 were intended to be protected not only from state action
but from private action as well.8 '
The opinion of the Court in Guest did not reach the issue of the state
action limitation but two concurring opinions which were embraced by
22. Id. at 101.
23. Id. at 104. E.g., In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532 (1895); Logan v. United States,
144 U.S. 263, 293-95 (1892); United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76, 77-81 (1884);
Ex parte Yarborough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
24. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, §§ 1, 2, 17 Stat. 13.
25. 403 U.S. at 99.
26. Id. at 105.
27. Id. at 107.
28. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
29. 450 F.2d at 1235.
30. See id. at 1233-34.
31. Id. at 1236-37.
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a majority of the Court 32 went on to discuss the issue and, apparently, to
some opaque degree reject it. In 1883, The Civil Rights Cases33 inter-
preted congressional power under section five and held that congres-
sional action based on the section had to be aimed at "State laws
or State proceedings, and be directed to the correction of their opera-
tion and effect." s 4 This interpretation, with some later erosions,3 5 had
previously prevailed. However, the opinions in Guest are to some extent
a repudiation of this position. Justice Clark stated that "there now can
be no doubt that the specific language of § 5 empowers the Congress to
enact laws punishing all conspiracies-with or without state action-that
interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights."3 6 Justice Brennan's opinion
also appeared to reject some aspects of the state action requirement, al-
though he appeared to qualify this by finding the necessary power in
Congress when its aim is to reach private activities that deny equal use
of and access to state facilities.3 7 This fairly limited view of Justice Bren-
nan's position is expounded by most commentators on the Guest case.3 8
It has been pointed out that Justice Clark must not have intended com-
pletely to reject a state action requirement in his Guest opinion because
he joined the majority the same day in United States v. Price,3 9 which
recognized a state-action requirement. 40
The court in Action took the position that Guest stands for more than
the limited view above, which is only another dilution of the state action
and corrective legislation interpretation of section five of the fourteenth
amendment, and that a close reading of Justice Brennan's opinion offers
support to that position. In a passage of that opinion, quoted in Action, it
is stated:
Although the Fourteenth Amendment itself, according to estab-
lished doctrine, "speaks to the State or to those acting under color
of its authority," legislation protecting rights created by that
Amendment, such as the right to equal utilization of state facilities,
need not be confined to punishing conspiracies in which state
officers participate.4 1
Could not this passage be read as recognizing an extinguishment of the
state action requirement when Congress is seeking to protect constitutional
32. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 762 (1966) (Clark, J., concurring,
joined by Black, J., and Fortas, J.); id. at 782-83 (Brennan, J., concurring in part,
issenting in part, joined by Warren, C. J., and Douglas, J.).
33. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
34. Id. at 11-12.
35. See Note, Fourteenth Amendment Congressional Power to Legislate Against
Private Discriminations: The Guest Case, 52 CoRm=i.. L.Q. 586, 594-96 (1967).
36. 383 U.S. at 762 (Clark, *., concurring).
37. Id. at 784 (Brennan, J., concurring).
38. See Buchanan, Federal Regulation of Private Racial Prejudice: A Study
of Law in Search of Morality, 56 IowA L. Rtv. 473, 497-98 (1971); Feuerstein,
Civil Rights Crimes and the Federal Power to Punish Private Individuals for Inter-ference with Federally Secured Rights, 19 VAND. L. REv. 641, 674 (1966); Note,
supra note 35, at 589.
39. 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
40. Note, supra note 35, at 589.
41. 383 U.S. at 782 (Brennan, J., concurring).
[Vol. 37
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rights such as the first amendment right to worship?42 The mention of
"the right to equal utilization of state facilities" preceded by the term
"such as" then would be only an example of rights that Congress can pro-
tect from racially motivated conspiracies under section five of the fourteenth
amendment.
While the decision of the court in Action can be supported credibly
by the position adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court in Guest, it
can also be supported by the legislative history surrounding the adoption
of the fourteenth amendment. The court pointed out that this history
has been "examined and reexamined by legal scholars," 43 and concluded
that the history indicated that Congress was to have the power to legislate
under section five to protect fourteenth amendment rights from individual
and state conspiracies. 44
The Supreme Court had restricted Congress' power to require a state
officer to perform a duty, apparently including those based on constitu-
tional rights, 45 during the period in which the amendment was being
debated. Because of this, it has been suggested by one writer that "the
congressional debates probably centered around the policy which would
operate to protect civil rights should the state fail to do so." 46 The majority
of writers on the subject support the view that the court in Action adopted.
For example, tenBroek, on whose analysis the court placed reliance,47
states that "the protection intended [by the fourteenth amendment] was
not merely against state action."48 His rationale for this view is that prior
to the adoption of the amendment there were widespread acts of violence
being committed against Negroes by individuals, and evidence of this
was purposefully included in the record of the committee drafting the
amendment. He suggests that this positive effort to include such testimony
in the committee's record would be pointless if the amendment was not
intended to deal with this problem. 49
Less conclusive support for the court's position can be found in various
statements of legislators involved in the debate over the amendment, and
a viable argument also can be made for a conflicting view.50 It has been
pointed out that any theory based on the congressional debates is incon-
clusive due to the fact that there were two and possibly three factions
debating the amendment's scope and, as a result, "the intent of the fram-
ers . . . was not clearly expressed in the course of the discussion." 51
42. See 450 F.2d at 1233-34.
48. Id. at 1236.
44. Id. at 1237.
45. Note, supra note 35, at 590.
46. Id.
47. 450 F.2d at 1236 n.15.
48. J. TENBRoEK, EQUAL UNDER LAw 203 (rev. ed. 1965).
49. Id. at 204; see also Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1853, 1855 (1964).
50. See Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some Reflected Light on
State Action and the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 ST. L. L.J. 331 (1967). As the
court in Action pointed out, the author's argument that the legislative history
indicates that state action is a requirement was made to the Supreme Court in
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). As a result, the Court was aware of
his position when Guest was handed down. 450 F.2d at 1236 n.15.
51. Note, supra note 35, at 591.
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The court in Action, after stating its interpretation of section 1985 (3),
held that injunctive relief was proper under the statute. 52 This holding
appears justified; however, it should be pointed out that there is an absence
of case authority supporting this proposition. Furthermore, the granting
of an injunction under section 1985 (3) is arguably only an expedient to
circumvent the state action requirement expressed in 42 U.S.C. section
1983, which otherwise fits a situation of this type and by its terms provides
for injunctions.
Bell v. Hood53 does appear to support the court's position. However,
that case also involved the question whether to grant federal jurisdiction
over a complaint, rather than just the question whether a cause of action
was stated by the complaint. The language relied on by the court in
Action appears to refer to the grant of jurisdiction. Additionally, the state-
ment from Bell that
[i]t is also well settled that where legal rights have been invaded,
and a federal statute provides a general right to sue for such in-
vasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good
the wrong done...54
was apparently in reference to broad interpretations placed on the Tucker
Act,55 which was the statute giving the Court of Claims jurisdiction to
hear claims based on contracts with the United States. Only in the broadest
sense of indicating a philosophy of granting relief to those harmed under
federal law can this be considered authority for granting an injunction
under section 1985 (8). Paradoxically, Bell and the cases it cited all involve
the provision of remedies for violations of law by government officials. 56
Another case cited by the court in Action seems to justify injunctive relief
only in this broad sense. Brewer v. Hoxie School District No. 46,57 in
which such relief was granted, was brought under section 1983, which
expressly allows suits in equity, as well as under section 1985 (3).
Taken as a whole these cases are authority for an injunction, but
they are noticeably weak. Furthermore, another factor bearing on the
question makes the court's position even more questionable. Section
1983, which expressly provides for injunctive relief. and section
1985 (3), which expressly provides for the recovery of damages, were original-
ly enacted as one statute58 with section 1983 roughly corresponding to
section one and section 1985 (3) contained within section two. It seems
odd that the statute would have expressly provided for different remedies
for the respective sections unless the intent of the legislators was to do just
that. Based on this reason, and those previously given, the holding in
Action that injunctive relief was proper under section 1985 (3) is open to
some question.
52. 450 F.2d at 1237.
53. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
54. Id. at 684.
55. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505.
56. Bell involved a suit against F.B.I. agents for violation of the fourth and
fifth amendments, and the cases cited in Bell involve actions of government offi-
cials and agencies. See 327 U.S. at 684 n.7.
57. 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956).
58. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, §§ 1, 2, 17 Stat. 13.
[Vol. 37
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Despite this, Action is clearly authority for seeking relief under sec-
tion 1985 (8) from conspiracies involving state action, or private individuals
motivated by racial or class discrimination, when the aim of the con-
spiracy is to violate rights based on national citizenship or rights guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights that have been found to apply to the states through
the fourteenth amendment. It also indicates a broadened interpretation
of the Supreme Court's opinion in the Guest case that could lead to a
new source of power in Congress, under section five of the fourteenth
amendment, to enact legislation dealing with private action (as long as
the qualifying factor of racially motivated discrimination is included).
Although Congress has not yet treated the Guest case as granting it this
power,5 9 there is some indication from Action that it would be justified in
doing so. The new life that has been given section 1985(8) by decisions
such as Griffin and Action is evidenced by the increasingly widespread in-
dusion of the statute in civil rights complaints.6 0 If the Action interpre-




DEALING WITH THE CORPORATION-
THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
Ruetz v. Topping'
The Mound City Screw Products Company, a Missouri corporation,
had as its shockholders Lewis Ruetz, Adolph Weber, Alex Topping, Rob-
ert Topping and Donald Topping. At one time or another, all the stock-
holders served as directors, officers and employees of the corporation (a
common practice in closely held corporations). For a time, Alex Topping's
wife also served on the company's board of directors.
The stockholders agreed informally that those stockholders who active-
ly participated in the daily operations of the business should receive a
fixed salary, plus a pro rata share of the company's net profits. However,
the president began to make the determination as to the division ot net
profits among the active stockholders. The continuance of the latter prac-
tice was approved several times by the board of directors.
59. See 18 U.S.C. § 245 (1970). This statute apparently is based on the Supreme
Court's decision in Guest, because all violations of the statute are tied to activities
that involve the use of or access to state or federal facilities, and therefore indi-
cates that Congress has not read Guest as a total abolishment of the state action
requirement, as the court in Action has done.
60. See, e.g., Sinclair v. Spatocco, 452 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1971), petition for
cert. filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3514 (U.S. Apr. 6, 1972) (No. 71-1279); Richardson v. Miller,
446 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1971); Place v. Shepherd, 446 F.2d 1239 (6th Cir. 1971);
Harrison v. Brooks, 446 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1971).
1. 453 S.W.2d 624 (St. L. Mo. App. 1970).
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In 1964, Alex and Robert were in control of the board of directors
and allegedly forced Lewis Ruetz to resign as an officer and employee
of the corporation. Subsequently, Ruetz instituted an action against the
corporation and Alex, Robert and Donald Topping to have the corpora-
tion liquidated; to recover sums allegedly due him under a termination
of employment agreement; and to recover, for the benefit of the corpora-
tion, allegedly excessive compensation paid to the defendant-stockholders.
Apparently, after receiving notice of the action, the defendants changed
the method of remuneration by increasing fixed salaries paid to active
stockholders and terminating the president's authority to distribute bonuses
from the net profits of the business.
The lower court rendered a judgment in favor of the defendants on
the issues of corporate liquidation and excessive compensation. The action
on the termination of employment contract was dismissed without prejudice.
Ruetz appealed only from the adverse judgment on the shareholder's deriva-
tive action to recover excessive compensation paid to the defendants.
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the defendant-stockholders
were paid excessive compensation after 1962. The St. Louis Court of Appeals
held that the plaintiff was not barred by laches from bringing the cause
of action to recover excessive compensation paid to defendants after 1964,
the year in which the plaintiff resigned as an officer and employee of the
company. Furthermore, the court held that the outcome of the case was
controlled by its holding in Binz v. St. Louis Hide 6- Tallow Co.2 The
Binz court discarded the traditional rule that an officer-director's contract
with his corporation, when approved by an interested board,3 is voidable 4
regardless of fairness,6 and instead stated:
[T]he modern rule is that such acts are only voidable and that in
a suit by a minority stockholder to set aside a salary set by a self-
dealing officer director, the officer director has an opportunity to
prove that the salary set was reasonable and justified by the serv-
ices performed. Yet it is clear that when it appears the salary was
set by self-dealing, then the burden of proof in justifying this
salary is upon the officer director.6
2. 378 S.W.2d 228 (St. L. Mo. App. 1964), noted in Grimm, Corporations-
Directors' Contracts with the Corporation-Burden of Proof, 30 Mo. L. REv. 628
(1965).
3. An interested board exists either when an interested director's presence
is necessary to constitute a quorum or the interested director's vote is necessary
to pass the resolution. When either occurs, the director is considered to be dealing
with himself. Hill v. Rich Hill Coal Mining Co., 119 Mo. 9, 22, 24 S.W. 223,
226 (1893).
4. A number of decisions state that the contracts are "void". However, it
is clear that the courts mean "voidable" and not "void" ab initio. See Kitchen v.
St. Louis, K.C. & N. Ry., 69 Mo. 224, 254 (1878). This is so in nearly all juris-
dictions following the majority rule. 3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW or
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 917 (rev. vol. M. Wolf ed. 1965).
5. This is apparently the rule followed in a majority of jurisdictions. 3 W.
FLETCHER, supra note 4, § 924. But see Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?, 22 Bus.
LAw. 35, 43 (1966), which states that since 1960 the majority view has been that
such contracts can only be avoided if unfair. See generally 19 C.J.S. Corporations
§ 781 (1940); 19 AM. JUR. 2d Corporations § 1291 (1965).
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Thus, the court remanded the case for a determination of the reasonable-
ness of the defendants' salaries.
Three alternative theories can explain the holding in Binz. First, even
though the traditional approach of voiding the contract is followed, the
self-dealing director can prevail on the theory of quantum meruit if he
can show that his services were of sufficient benefit to the corporation to
justify his compensation.7 However, in Missouri, for an officer or director
to recover for services rendered, he would have to overcome the presump-
tion that services of a director or an officer are gratuitously performed8
This presumption is difficult to overcome because the director or officer
must show the existence of a charter provision, or, in the alternative, a
by-law or resolution legally passed before any services are rendered,9 which
generally provides for payment of salaries to officers or directors.10 Thus,
in Missouri it is practically impossible for a self-dealing director to recover
on the theory of quantum meruit. To say that Binz allows recovery on a
quantum meruit theory would either be a complete renunciation of the
presumption against compensation of officers and directors or, at least,
an exception thereto.
The second theory to explain Binz is Fletcher's analysis that Binz is
one of the few cases which supports a narrow exception to the presump-
tion against compensation of officers and directors. 11 The exception is
that officers and directors of small, closely held corporations can recover
on a quantum meruit theory even though the corporation has made no
provision for compensation. 12 This exception is based on the minimal risk
of injury to third parties (e.g., inactive shareholders), and other practical
considerations, such as
a tendency in modern times toward the formulation of small busi-
ness corporations and, realizing that those most interested and
holding practically all the stock will in all probability become the
directors and officers thereof .... 13
The corporations in Ruetz and Binz fit within this exception and its under-
lying policy. In both corporations virtually all the stock was held by a
small group whose members were actively involved in the day-to-day
business of the corporation.
7. Id. at 230-31 and cases cited therein.
8. See Pfeiffer v. Lansberg Brake Co., 44 Mo. App. 59, 67-68 (St. L. Ct. App.
1891); 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2109
(rev. vol. M. Wolf ed. 1967) and Missouri cases cited therein. However, if it can
be shown that a director or officer renders services outside the line and scope
of duty, such director or officer can recover for the reasonable value of services
rendered. Bell v. Peper Tobacco Warehouse Co., 205 Mo. 475, 490-91, 103 S.W.
1014, 1018 (1907).
9. See Ferrenbach v. Edward Fehlig & Co., 80 S.W.2d 705 (St. L. Mo. App.1985).
10. Id. This rule is followed in most states as to directors, but there is
some split in the cases with respect to services rendered by officers as such. Under
certain circumstances there may be an implied agreement to provide reasonable
payment for services of the officer. 5 W. FLETCHER, supra note 8, §§ 2111-13. But see
Kinsella v. Marquette Fin. Corp., 16 S.W.2d 619, 620 (St. L. Mo. App. 1929).
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The final and broadest explanation of the Binz decision is that it
adopts the "fairness" doctrine, the so-called enlightened minority posi-
tion on self-dealing directors' contracts; 14 that is, although the interested
director's participation gives life to the contract between the director and
his corporation, the corporation cannot avoid the contract unless the con-
tract is unfair.' 5 But, the director has the burden of proving fairness,16
and thus, the contract is presumed to be unfair until the director sustains
that burden.' 7 If the court in Binz did adopt the "fairness" doctrine, it is
unclear whether its adoption was an in toto renunciation of the traditional
rule or merely an exception to it, relevant only when the contract is for
the payment of personal services.' 8
Until the Binz and Ruetz decisions, Missouri followed the tradi-
tional rule on directors' contracts with their corporation, upholding them
only when the contract was approved by a disinterested board and was
fair.19 If the contract was approved by an interested board it was held to
be voidable at the option of the corporation, 20 regardless of the contract's
fairness, 2 1 harm to the corporation, or the director's "utmost good faith. '22
In other words, the corporation could elect to avoid the contract once
self-dealing on the part of the director could be shown. This, coupled with
the difficulty of recovering on a quantum meruit theory, yielded the harsh
result that a self-dealing officer-director could not recover anything even
if his services as an officer were of great value to the corporation. Theoreti-
cally, this inability to recover would deter self-dealing, 23 and, as a prac-
tical matter, the courts were relieved of the intellectually perplexing task
of determining a contract's fairness.24
14. See Grimm, supra note 2, at 629.
15. 3 W. FLETCHER, supra note 4, § 931; 19 AM. Jum. 2D Corporations § 1291
(1965); 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 781 (1940).
16. Grimm, supra note 2, at 630.
17. 5 W. FLETCHER, supra note 8, § 2129.
18. See generally Schufeldt v. Smith, 131 Mo. 280, 31 S.W. 1039 (1895), in
which the court created another exception to the majority rule by upholding,
based on fairness, the preferences of director-creditors approved by an interested
board. But see Pitman v. Chicago Lead Co., 93 Mo. App. 592, 67 S.W. 946 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1902).
19. Kitchen v. St. Louis, K.C. & N. Ry., 69 Mo. 224, 254 (1878).
20. Hill v. Rich Hill Coal Mining Co., 119 Mo. 9, 24 S.W. 223 (1893);
Keokuk N. Line Packet Co. v. Davidson. 95 Mo. 467, 8 S.W. 545 (1888); Ward
v. Davidson, 89 Mo. 445, 1 S.W. 846 (1886).
21. Hill v. Rich Hill Coal Mining Co., 119 Mo. 9, 24 S.W. 223 (1893).
22. Bromschwig v. Carthage Marble & White Lime Co., 334 Mo. 319, 324,
66 S.W.2d 889, 892 (1933).
23. In Hill v. Rich Hill Coal Mining Co., 119 Mo. 9, 23-24, 24 S.W. 223,
226 (1893), the court stated:
[Munson] stood in the attitude of selling as owner and purchasing as
trustee. The law permits no one to act in such inconsistent relations. It
does not stop to inquire whether the contract or transaction was fair or
unfair. It stops the inquiry when the relation is disclosed, and sets aside
the transaction or refuses to enforce it, at the instance of the party whom
the fiduciary undertook to represent, without undertaking to deal with
the question of abstract justice in the particular case. It prevents frauds
by making them, as far as may be, impossible, knowing that real motives
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The underlying theory of this traditional rule is that a corporate direc-
tor is analogous to a trustee25 (because both are fiduciaries) and, as such,
is prohibited from using that which he holds in trust for his own benefit.
The extent to which the director is characterized as a trustee is a matter
of judicial discretion. 20
However, even before Binz and Ruetz, the Missouri Supreme Court had
chipped away at this traditional rule. Construing its holding in Kitchen v.
St. Louis, Kansas City & Northern Ry., 27 the court in Foster v. Mullanphy
Planing-Mill Co.28 stated: "[W]hile sometimes voidable, on timely and
direct application to set them aside, the contracts were not absolutely void
as to such participating directors." 29
Thus, having backed away from a blind application of the traditional
rule, the court in Schufeldt v. Smith, when faced with one type of self-
dealing, held that the decisive question was the "fairness" of a preference
given to a creditor-director by an interested board.30 Basing this decision
on the best interests of the corporation, the court stated:
But it cannot be said, as a direct proposition of law, that officers
of a corporation cannot themselves and in their own names con-
tract with it. To so hold would virtually deny corporations the
credit upon which so much of the business of the country is trans-
acted, and which is so essential to success. .... A corporation
naturally looks to those interested in its affairs for accommoda-
tion.81
The Missouri Supreme Court has not created any other exception to
,the traditional rule.3 2 Thus, until Binz and Ruetz, the rule had been ap-
plied strictly in cases involving self-dealing officer-directors' contracts for
compensation. 33 Moreover, the Missouri courts of appeals, until now, never
backed away from applying the traditional rule in any situation.3 4 How-
ever, in Yax v. Dit-Mco, Inc.,3 5 the supreme court, in dictum, evaluated
the fairness of a contract for sale of stock, notwithstanding the essential
25. .3 W. FLETCHER, supra note 4, § 924.
26. Compare Hill v. Rich Hill Coal Mining Co., 119 Mo. 9, 22, 24 S.W. 223,
226 (1893) with Schufeldt v.'Smith, 131 Mo. 280, 289, 31 S.W. 1039, 1041 (1895)
and Frankford Exch. Bank v. McCune, 72 S.W.2d 155, 158 (St. L. Mo. App. 1934).
27. 69 Mo. 224 (1878).
28. 92 Mo. 79, 4 S.W. 260 (1887).
29. ld. at 87, 4 S.W. at 269 (emphasis added).
30. Schufeldt v. Smith, 131 Mo. 280, 289, 31 S.W. 1039, 1041 (1895).
31. Id. at 291, 31 S.W. at 1040.
32. Glassburn v. Lakeland Dev. Co., 340 S.W.2d 641 (Mo. 1960); Bromschwig
v. Carthage Marble Se White Lime Co., 334 Mo. 319, 66 S.W.2d 889 (1933).
33. Keokuk N. Line Packet Co. v. Davidson, 95 Mo. 467, 473, 8 S.W. 545,
.546 (1888); Funsten v. Funsten Comm'n Co., 67 Mo. App. 559 (St. L. Ct. App.
1896); Davis Mill Co. v. Bennett, 39 Mo. App. 460 (K.C. Ct. App. 1889); Ben-
nett v: St. Louis Car Roofing Co., 19 Mo. App. 349 (St. L. Ct. App. 1885).
34. See Johnson v. Duensing, 340 S.W.2d 758 (K.C. Mo. App. 1960); Frank-
ford Exch. Bank v. McCune, 72 S.W.2d 155 (St. L. Mo. App. 1934); Central Mfg.
Co. v. Montgomery, 144 Mo. App. 494, 129 S.W. 460 (Spr. Ct. App. 1910); Pitman
•v. Chicago Lead Co., 93 Mo. App. 592, 67 S.W. 946 (K.C. Ct. App. 1902); Patrick
v. Boonville Gas Light Co., 17 Mo. App. '162 (St. L. Ct. App. 1885).
35. 366 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. 1963), noted in Brauninger, Corporations-Inter.
ested Directors Dealing with the Corporation, 29 Mo. L. R.v. 90 (1964).
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participation of an interested director in approving the resolution, and
the fact that his presence was necessary to constitute a quorum at the board
meeting.30 Obviously, if it were not this dictum, the Binz and Ruetz
decisions would find little support in the strong line of Missouri cases
following the traditional rule as to directors' contracts with the corpora-
tion. Because the "fairness" of interested directors' contracts may now be
considered by at least some Missouri courts, the Ruetz case is of particular
importance because it defines criteria with which to measure the "fair-
ness" of service contracts. 37
Both Fletcher3 s and relevant tax cases39 provided the Ruetz court with
a multi-factor test for judging the fairness of a service contract: (1) salaries
paid to similar employees in similar businesses or, if the business is unique,
previous salaries paid in the same business; (2) time devoted by the -esn-
ployee to the business; (3) size and complexity of the business; (4) difficulty
of the work performed; (5 profitability of the business; (6) dividend policy
of the business; and (7) the employee's qualifications for the position.40
These factors identify "fairness" at two points in time-the time the
contract is entered into and the time after the service is performed. Fair-
ness of the contract at the time of making is measured by the prevailing
conditions in the labor market, qualifications of the employee, difficulty
of the work to be performed, dividend policy of the business, and size
and complexity of the business. On the other hand, a quantum meruit
approach is used to measure fairness after the services have -been per-
formed. Corporate profitability, time devoted to work, and difficulty of
work performed identify the fairness of the compensation paid relative
to services actually rendered to the corporation. Since the issue under a
quantum meruit approach is the fairness of the value placed on the serv-
ices performed, only the factors which measure the actual "benefit" of
the services rendered to the corporation would be relevant.41 Obviously,
the factors measuring the fairness of the contract at the time of making
would be irrelevant. The Ruetz court did not recognize this distinction.
However, the true test of fairness should be: Did the airectois place
the interests of the corporation first?42 If the board's judgment was in the
36. See id. at 367.
37. Different factors are used to measure fairness depending on whether the
contract involves services, property, or loans. Often, the judicial test for fairness
is the "chancellor's foot". Note, The Fairness Test of Corporate Contracts with
Interested Directors, 61 HARv. L. REv. 335, 337 (1948).
38. 5 W. FLETCHER, supra note 8, at 2133.
39. Reasonable compensation paid may be deducted by the corporation as a
business expense. When salaries have been approved by an interested board the
reasonableness of the compensation is examined. See, e.g., Palmetto Pump & Irrig.
Co. v. Tomlinson, 9 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1136 (S.D. Fla. 1962), aff'd, 313 F.2d
220 (5th Cir. 1963).
40. Ruetz v. Topping, 453 S.W.2d 624, 628-29 (St. L. Mo. App. 1970). The
case was remanded to the lower court for a determination on the merits, based
on these factors.
41. See Annot., 27 A.L.R. 300, 305 (1927). But see Palmetto Pump & Irrig.
Co. v. Tomlinson, 9 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1136 (S.D. Fla. 1962), in which all the
factors are viewed as having relevance to the reasonableness of the services actually
rendered.
42. Note, supra note 37.
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best interests of the corporation at the time the contract was made, the
contract should be' enforced just as a disinterested board's judgment would
be enforced.43 Only the factors measuring fairness at the time the coi-
tract was made would be determinative under this approach.
The factor of "corporate profitability" was emphasized by the Ruet,
court.4 4 However, this factor, as suggested above, should be irrelevant
because it does not measure fairness at the" time of the contract's making.
Indeed, this factor should be de-emphasized because other variables (e g.,
governmental manipulation of the economy) may substantially influence
the profitability of any company. Moreover, when a corporation is profitable
the courts-could have a propensity towards generosity and allow everyone
to recover since there is plenty of money to go around. But, when profits
are- low the interested directors may be discriminated against.
- In conclusion, the trend-in Missouri, although ambiguous as in other
jurisdictions, is toward an acceptance of the "fairness" doctrine.4 5 Because
of the dictum in the Yax decision, the Ruetz and Binz decisions are sup-
ported in-their adoption of a new approach in dealing with interested
directors. Also, credence is given to this new approach by the cases which
uphold self-dealing director-creditor's preferences based on the "fairness"
doctrine.
Theie is no reason to distinguish between the types of interested
directors' contracts to which the "fairness" doctrine should apply. The
rationale underlying the acceptance of the "fairness" doctrine in the
Schufeldt case is persuasive, not only in cases involving creditor prefer-
ences, but also in cases involving services and property. As a practical mat-
ter, directors are just as likely to be called on to provide services to the
corporation as they would be to lend money.
There are two basic reasons why the traditional rule should give way
to the "fairness" doctrine.4 6 First, the traditional rule is based on the
fallacious analogy47 that a director is a trustee.48 This analogy leads to
the cynical conclusion that an interested director is unlikely or unable to
43. When a contract with a director is approved by a distinterested board
and is fair, it cannot be avoided by the corporation. Hill v. Rich Hill Coal Min-
ing Co., 119 Mo. 9, 22, 24 S.W. 223, 226 (1893).
44. 453 S.W.2d at 632.
45. Marsh, supra note 5, at 43.
46. Grimm, supra note 2, at 629.
47. In In re Dissolution of E.G. Warner Co., 232 Minn. 207, 212, 45 N.W.2d
388, 392 (1950), the court stated:
Confusion has resulted from a failure to recognize that the position of a
director of a corporation, though fiduciary in many respects, is sui generis
and is not to be confused with the position of that of a trustee, quasi
trustee, or agent.
See Hancock, The Fallacy of the Transplanted Category, 37 CAN. B. REv. 535,
574-75 (1959), where the author describes the "fallacy of the transplanted cate-
gory" as the giving of a word or concept in one context the same meaning in a
different context. Thus, because a fiduciary can be either a trustee or director
does ndi- ieaii-they are the same.
48. See generally Garner, Directors as Trustees, 92 L.J. 298 (1942); and Marsh,
supra note 5, at 25. For a famour debate on this subject compare Dodd, For Whom
are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1145 (1932), with Berle, For
Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: A Note, 15 HARv. L. REv. 1865 (1932).
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represent the corporation's best interests. As Professor Lattin hag observed:
"[Tlhere has been the surprising discovery in some quarters that directors,
for the most part, are not bent on skulduggery." 49 Second, the traditional
rule can be used to the detriment of those it is designed to protect. For
example, under the traditional rule, a disenchanted minority shareholder
can wield coercive power by threatening to bring an action to void an-
interested director's contract even when the contract serves the best interests
of the corporation, its stockholders, and its creditors.
If the new approach is followed by other Missouri courts, the Ruetz
case provides criteria for determining fairness, at least in cases concerned
with personal service contracts. On the other hand, should it turn out
that the St. Louis Court of Appeals merely adopted a quantum meruit
approach, then the Ruetz case provides criteria for analysis of the actual
value of services performed by interested directors. Clearly, the Missouri
Supreme Court needs to provide leadership in the area of interested direc-
tors' contracts with their corporation.
C. THomAs WsNER, JR.
EVIDENCE-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-PROBABLE CAUSE
WHEN AN INFORMER'S TIP IS USED TO
OBTAIN A SEARCH WARRANT
United States v. Harris1
Harris was convicted by a federal district court in Kentucky for pos-
sessing several jugs of whiskey upon which no federal tax had been paid.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that the
federal tax investigator's affidavit, which supported the evidence-producing
search warrant, was insufficient to establish probable cause.2 The affidavit
stated that: (1) Harris had a reputation with the affiant for the last four
years as a trafficker in non-taxpaid distilled spirits; (2) during this period
the affiant had received considerable information from a number of people
concerning Harris' illicit whiskey activities; (3) once during these four
years the local constable had located illicit whiskey in an abandoned house
under Harris' control; (4) an informer told affiant that he had purchased
illicit whiskey from Harris a number of times over the last two years, most
recently within two weeks; (5) the informer knew of another who had
purchased whiskey on Harris' premises within the past two days; (6) the
informer had seen whiskey consumed in Harris' dance hall and many
times had seen Harris go to a building 50 yards from the dance hall to
obtain illicit whiskey for the informer and other persons; and (7) the affiant
had interviewed the informer and found him to be a prudent person.
The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the conviction,3 but delivered
no majority opinion.
49. N. LATrIN, TnE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 290-91 (2d ed. 1971).
1. 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
2. 412 F.2d 796 (6th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
3. 403 U.S. at 573.
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To understand the significance of United States v. Harris, one must
first understand previous case law which has dealt with the question of
what is required in an affidavit to sufficiently establish probable cause for
obtaining a search warrant when part or all of the affidavit is based upon
hearsay evidence from an unnamed informer.4 To protect citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures, the fourth amendment prohibits the
issuance of search warrants5 except on probable cause. 6 Generally, the
courts require probable cause to be based on facts and circumstances, either
within the affiant's own knowledge or of which he has reasonably trust-
worthy information, that are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of
reasonable caution to believe that items subject to seizure are in a specified
location. 7 The Supreme Court has said the determination of probable cause
should be based upon probabilities-the "factual and practical considera-
tions of everyday life"s-and not on legal technicalities or a prima facie
showing of guilt.9 In United States v. Ventresca,'0 the Court stated that
affidavits should be interpreted in a "commonsense and realistic fashion.""
Reviewing courts, in determining if probable cause had been sufficiently
established for a warrant to issue, may consider only information that was
presented to the magistrate.12
In Jones v. United States,'3 the Supreme Court expressly approved the
4. For additional background and articles on this subject and comments on
the important cases, see: Burnett, Search Warrants: Impact and Application of
Chimel and Spinelli and Related Problems, 29 Fm.. B.J. 170, 179-84 (1970); Com-
ment, Criminal Procedure-Search Warrants-For Informant's Tips to Establish
Probable Cause Such Tips Must Meet Aguilar Standards Even When Partially
Corroborated by Independent Investigation, 21 S.C. L. Racy. 246 (1969); Note,
The Informer's Tip as Probable Cause for Search or Arrest, 54 CORNELL L. REv.
958 (1969); Note, Spinelli v. United States: Searching for Probable Cause, 30 U.
PiTT. L. REv. 755 (1969).
5. A probable cause determination by a neutral magistrate is preferred over
that of a police officer acting on his own; therefore, a reviewing court will usually
accept less persuasive and competent evidence in sustaining a magistrate's deter-
mination than would be required to establish probable cause for an officer acting
on his own without a warrant. Jones v. United States, 262 U.S. 257, 270 (1960);
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964).
6. Evidence is inadmissable when obtained in violation of the fourth amend-
ment. This rule is applied to the states via the fourteenth amendment. Mapp v.
Ohio, 867 U.S. 643 (1961). Kerr v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963), held warrants
on all levels (local, state, and federal) must be based on the same standard of
probable cause.
7. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925); accord, Berger v. New
York, 588 U.S. 41, 55 (1967); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).
This definition of probable cause applies to either searches or arrests. Draper
v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310-11 (1959); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 n.6
(1964).
8. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
9. Id. at 174-75; accord, United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 107 (1965);
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 311 (1959).
10. 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
11. Id. at 108.
12. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413 n.3 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108, 109 n.1 (1964); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486-87
(1958).
13. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
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use of hearsay evidence in establishing probable cause,14 provided the
affidavit presented a "substantial basis" for the magistrate to conclude that
seizable items were in the specified location. 15 In Aguilar v. Texas,!(
the Court articulated the standard to be followed when the affidavit is
based solely on a tip from an unnamed informer. In that case, a warrant
was issued upon an affidavit which stated that the affiant had received
"reliable information" from a "credible" person who believed that narcotics
were being kept and sold within a certain apartment in violation of the
law.17 In holding that the warrant had been improperly issued, the Court
said that although probable cause may be established by hearsay informa-
tion alone, the magistrate must be informed of (1) the "underlying circum-
stances" upon which the informer bases his conclusion that the seizable
items are where he claims they are; and (2) the "underlying circumstances"
from which the officer concludes that the informant, named or unnamed,
is credible (trustworthy), or that his information is reliable.' 8
To meet the first requirement of the "two-pronged" Aguilar test-that
the magistrate be appraised of the informer's basis of knowledge-the
affiant must state how the informer gained his information so that the
magistrate can determine if the "underlying circumstances" justify the con-
clusion that seizable items are located in a specified place. A statement
that the informer bases his conclusion upon personal observation (if he
has) is the easiest way to satisfy the requirement. 19 Or, as the Court in
Spinelli v. United States20 suggested, if the tip is sufficiently detailed, the
magistrate may be justified in believing that the informant received his
information in a reliable manner (such as personal observation) and not
merely by overhearing a remark at the local tavern.21
To meet the second Aguilar requirement-that the magistrate be pro-
vided with the underlying circumstances from which the officer concludes
that the informer is trustworthy-it is well settled that a mere assertion
that the informer is "reliable" or "credible" is not sufficient.2 2 The most
common way to show an informer is trustworthy is to include in the
affidavit a statement that the informer has previously given information
that has proven correct (if he has). 23 The courts have been lenient and
14. Previously, in federal courts hearsay evidence was not allowed when deter-
mining the existence of probable cause. Annot., 10 A.L.R.5d 359, 362 (1966).
15. 362 U.S. at 271.
16. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
17. Id. at 109.
18. Id. at 114.
19. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
20. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
21. Id. at 417. (The Court suggested that Draper v. United States, 358 U.S.
307 (1959), is a suitable benchmark by which to measure sufficiency of detail.)
See United States v. Drew, 436 F.2d 529, 532-34 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 977 (1971); Ludwig v. Wainwright, 434 F.2d 1104, 1106 (5th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Nasse, 432 F.2d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
938 (1971); People v. Hamilton, 71 Cal. 2d 176, 181, 454 P.2d 681, 684, 77 Cal.
Rptr. 785, 788 (1969).
22. E.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416 (1969).
23. See United States v. Nasse, 432 F.2d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 938 (1971); United States v. Dunnings, 425 F.2d 836, 839 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1002 (1970); People v. Hamilton, 71 Cal. 2d 176, 179,
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non-technical in this area.24 Courts have also said that named or unnamed
informers may be considered sufficiently credible if they are identified as
police officers,25 victims, 26 or uninvolved eyewitnesses.27 A question the
Court raised in United States v. Harris, but failed to answer, is: May an
informer's trustworthiness be inferred solely from the fact that in giving
information he admits to being a participant in the crime? Chief Justice
Burger answered affirmatively, stating that "[a]dmissions of crime . . .
carry their own indicia of credibility-sufficient at least to support finding
of probable cause to search." 28 He was joined in this portion of his opinion
by Justices White and Blackmun. Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Douglas,
Brennan, and Marshall, stated that such a position was against the basic
thrust of Aguilar-that warrants should not issue upon mere uncorroborated
hearsay.2 9 After pointing out that the government had not even suggested
such a theory, Harlan said that informer-participants should not be given
the status of "trustworthiness" until more argument is heard on the issue.30
Justices Stewart and Black voiced no opinion in this area; thus, this issue
has not been decided.3 1
If the informer has never given information before or cannot other-
wise be proved credible,32 then, before his statements can be used, the
454 P.2d 681, 683, 77 Cal. Rptr. 785. 787 (1969) ; People v. Tillman, 238 Cal. App.
2d 134, 138, 47 Cal. Rptr. 614, 617 (1965); Manley v. Commonwealth -Va.-, 176
S.E.2d 309, 313 (1970).
24. See, e.g., Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 530 (1964) (the in-
former was said to be credible when the affidavit merely said the informer had
given reliable information in the past); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257,
268-69 (1960) (the informer was said to be trustworthy although he had only
given information once in the past); United States v. Stallings, 413 F.2d 200, 204
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 972 (1969); United States v. Freeman, 358 F.2d
459, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 882 (1966).
25. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 111 (1965); Travis v. United
States, 362 F.2d 477, 481 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 885 (1966); United States
v. Plemmons, 336 F.2d 731, 734 (6th Cir. 1964); United States ex rel. Crawley v.
Rundle, 312 F. Supp. 15, 18 (E.D. Pa. 1969); People v. Tillman, 238 Cal. App. 2d
134, 140, 47 Cal. Rptr. 614, 618 (1965); State v. Howard, 184 Neb. 274, 284-85, 167
N.W.2d 80, 87 (1969); state v. Skinner, -Ore.-, 483 P.2d 87, 89 (1971).
26. McCreary v. Sigler, 406 F.2d 1264, 1269 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
984 (1969); People v. Griffen, 250 Cal. App. 2d 545, 550-51, 58 Cal. Rptr. 707, 711
(1967); State v. Skinner, -Ore.-, 483 P.2d 87, 89 (1971).
27. McCreary v. Sigler, 406 F.2d 1264, 1269 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
984 (1969); Coyne v. Watson, 282 F. Supp. 235, 237 (S.D. Ohio 1967), af 'd, 392
F.2d 585 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 951 (1968); People v. Lewis, 240 Cal.
App. 2d 546, 550, 49 Cal. Rptr. 579, 582 (1966); Commonwealth v. Crawley, 209 Pa.
Super. 70, 79, 223 A.2d 885, 890 (1966), affd mem., 432 Pa. 622, 247 A.2d 226 (1968).
28. 403 U.S. at 583 (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
29. Id. at 594 (opinion of Harlan, J.).
80. Id. at 595.
81. Id. at 585 (opinion of Stewart, J.). For cases supporting the proposition
that incriminating admissions tend to show reliability of the informer's statements,
see Commonwealth v. Stewart, -Mass.-, 267 N.E.2d 213, 216 (1971); Common-
wealth v. Owens, 350 Mass. 633, 635-36, 216 N.E.2d 411, 418 (1966); Gaston v.
State, 440 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Crim. App), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 969 (1969); Manley
v. Commonwealth, -Va.-, 176 S.E.2d 309, 313 (1970).
82. The informer may be of unknown reliability, United States v. Woodson,
303 F.2d 49, 50-51 (6th Cir. 1962), or even known as a "pathological liar," United
States v. Irby, 304 F.2d 280, 282-83 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 830 (1962).
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magistrate must be informed of "underlying circumstances" from which
the affiant could conclude that the information is reliable. This is an
alternate method for satisfying the second Aguilar requirement. This may
be done by presenting corroborating facts which were arrived at by inde-
pendent investigation or which are within the affiant's own knowledge.
Spinelli v. United States is considered the leading case in this area.
Spinelli involved an affidavit which stated that the affiant had received
a tip from an unnamed "reliable" informant that defendant Spinelli was
accepting wagers through telephones with the numbers WY4-0029 and
WY4-0136. In the affidavit the affiant also stated that the following facts
were within his personal knowledge: (1) the FBI had followed Spinelli
on four different occasions and had seen him enter a certain apartment;
(2) by checking with the phone company, it had been discovered that the
apartment contained telephones with numbers corresponding to the num-
bers given by the informant; and (3) Spinelli was known to the affiant
as a "known gambler" and bookmaker. The Supreme Court, in a 5-3
decision, held the affidavit insufficient to support a finding of probable
cause. Justice Harlan's majority opinion held the affidavit inadequate
because (1) it failed to explain how the informant acquired his information,
and (2) it failed to state why the informer should be considered trustworthy.
Further the "corroborating facts" were said to be insufficient to establish
the reliability of the tip. Harlan stated that having two phones did not
necessarily suggest gambling and certainly visiting an apartment did not.
Therefore, these allegations were accorded little weight. He found the
incriminating allegation that Spinelli was a "known gambler" to be a "bald
and unilluminating assertion of suspicion that is entitled to no weight in
appraising the magistrate's decision." 33 In short, Spinelli followed the
Aguilar two-pronged test.34 Most importantly, however, in testing the suf-
ficiency of the corroborating facts, Harlan analyzed each fact individually
to see if there was sufficient independent corroboration of the informer's
tip to justify a finding of probable cause.
How does United States v. Harris fit into this pattern of past case law?
In Harris, it was not disputed that the first Aguilar requirement was met
since the affidavit clearly revealed that the source of the informer's informa-
tion was personal observation. Determining whether or not the second
Aguilar requirement had been satisfied-that the magistrate be presented
with facts sufficient to demonstrate that the informer or the information
should be believed-provided the source of disagreement between the
Justices. In the affidavit the only corroborating facts presented were that
the affiant found the informer to be "prudent," and that Harris had a
reputation and past record as a dealer in illicit whiskey. A majority of
the Justices found there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of
probable cause. Chief Justice Burger delivered the judgment of the Court-
there being no majority opinion. Justice Harlan, who had delivered the
opinion in Spinelli, dissented.
One exception to the requirement of showing the credibility of the informer is
tax evasion cases. Jaben v. United States, 581 U.S. 214, 224 (1965).
3. 393 U.S. at 415-16.
34. Id. at 414.
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After interpreting the word "prudent" to mean "truthful," Chief
Justice Burger stated:
While a bare statement by an affiant that he believed the in-
formant to be truthful would not, in itself, provide a factual basis
for crediting the report of an unnamed informant, we conclude
that the affidavit in the present case contains an ample factual
basis for believing the informant which, when coupled with his
own knowledge of the respondent's background, afforded a basis
upon which a magistrate could reasonably issue a warrant.3 5
Burger reaffirmed the Aguilar test as interpreted by Spinelli; but he dis-
agreed with Spinelli insofar as it allowed no weight at all to be given to
the reputation of the person against whom a warrant is sought. Burger
stated that reputation alone is insufficient to support a finding of probable
cause, but it is not irrelevant.36 On this point, Burger cited Jones v. United
States, which had said that the fact that defendant was a known user of
narcotics made the statement that he had drugs in his apartment less "sub-
ject to scepticism." 37 He distinguished Spinelli from Jones by pointing out
that, in Spinelli, there had been nothing offered to support the statement
that Spinelli was a "known gambler," while in Jones the affidavit stated
that in the past Jones had admitted to being a drug user and had displayed
needle marks. Burger gave weight to Harris' reputation because the Harris
affidavit included the statements that in the past four years whiskey has
been seized from defendant and that affiant had received information from
numerous unidentified sources concerning defendant's illicit whiskey ac-
tivities. In effect, Burger said that if an affidavit based on information
supplied by an informer merely states either (1) that the informant is
"prudent" or "truthful," or (2) that the person against whom the warrant
is sought has a reputation consistent with the informer's statement, the affi-
davit is insufficient to support a finding of probable cause; but these two
factors combined will support a finding of probable cause. Burger apparent-
ly gives the most weight to reputation.
Justices Stewart and White joined with the judgment of the Court
without any helpful explanation.3 8 Justice Black agreed with Burger's
manner of distinguishing Harris from Spinelli.39 Black thought Spinelli
should be overruled since, as he wrote in his dissent in Spinelli, he felt that
Aguilar and Spinelli taken together required something akin to a "beyond
a reasonable doubt" test to be applied to determine whether a warrant
should issue.40 Justice Blackmun joined in Burger's opinion, pointing out,
in addition, that he felt Spinelli was wrongly decided since, in his opinion,
there had been sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause. 41
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan found nothing in the Harris
affidavit that could enable the magistrate to independently determine that
35. 403 U.S. at 579-80 (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
86. Id. at 582.
37. Id. at 581.
38. Id. at 585 (opinion of Stewart, J.).
39. Id. (opinion of Black, J.).
40. 393 U.S. at 429, 431.
41. 403 U.S. at 585 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
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the informant or his information should be considered truthful. Unlike
Burger, Harlan very carefully analyzed the two prongs of Aguilar, stressing
that the mere fact the informer claims first hand knowledge does not
negate the possibility that he lied.42 Harlan accorded little or no weight
to the affiant's statement that the informer was "prudent." He said that
it places no burden on law enforcement organizations to require the affiant
to state why he found the informant to be prudent.43 As to the weight to
be afforded to Harris' reputation, Harlan stated that the fact that whiskey
was seized sometime in the last four years from an abandoned house under
Harris' control hardly distinguished this situation from Spinelli in any
purposeful way.4 4 He said that the conviction for bootlegging certainly
could not elevate an otherwise unilluminated anonymous tip suggesting
similar activities, four years later, to probable cause for a search. Harlan
also stated that the assertion that the affiant had received information from
numerous persons as to Harris' activities was no different than asserting
that Spinelli was a "known gambler," 45 since such assertions were mere
"affirmance of belief or suspicion" and offer nothing upon which the
magistrate could independently make a finding of probable cause.46 Harlan
agreed with Burger's statement that reputation standing alone is insuf-
ficient,41 but challenged Burger's analysis, arguing that
only the respondent's reputation has been seriously invoked to
establish the credibility of the informant, an element of probable
cause entirely severable from the requirement that the confidant's
source be reliable.48
In conclusion, Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Harris would seem
to allow a less demanding standard for determining the reliability of an
informant's tip when the tip is corroborated by facts within the affiant's
own knowledge. In a careful opinion, Harlan argued that the approval of
the Harris affidavit completely ignored the second A guilar requirement.
Harlan's methodical approach for examining and weighing each corroborat-
ing fact in determining if a finding of probable cause is justified certainly
seems to offer more predictability than Burger's less definite approach.
The Burger approach may leave the magistrate uncertain as to the weight
to be given a particular fact. On the other hand, although Harlan's ap-
proach enhances predictability, in practice perhaps it would occasionally
lead to the invalidation of a search warrant based on otherwise sufficient
underlying circumstances which were not fully presented due to the inad-
vertance of the affiant or magistrate. Although there is no majority opinion
in Harris, the mere approval of this affidavit definitely indicates, as Harlan
alleged, a trend among the Justices to weaken the spirit of Spinelli.
R. JAMES STILLEY, JR.
42. Id. at 592 (opinion of Harlan, J.).
43. Id. at 599-600.
44. Id. at 596.
45. Id. at 596-97.
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EVIDENCE-UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE
BY A PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL
State v. Brecht1
On May 18, 1967, Robert Brecht was charged with murder in the first
degree for the shooting death of his wife, Mary Ann. A material witness
for the prosecution was the sister of the deceased, Sandra Brumfield. Sandra
testified that the defendant phoned her mother's house, where both she
and Mary Ann were staying. Sandra answered the phone, recognized
Brecht's voice, and called to Mary Ann to answer. She then went into
another room, picked up the extension phone, and listened in on the con-
versation. She heard Brecht threaten her sister as follows: "I got my shot-
gun out of hock, I am coming down and I will use it if I have to." 2 This
phone conversation was admitted into evidence in the trial court. The jury
returned a verdict of murder in the second degree and Brecht received a
30-year prison term.
In a post-conviction relief proceeding, the defendant contended the
admission of Sandra's testimony concerning the threat was prejudicial and
reversible error. The Supreme Court of Montana held: (1) that the ad-
mission of this testimony violated the defendant's fourth and fourteenth
amendment right to privacy against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(2) that it also violated his same rights under the Montana Constitution;
and (3) that the evidence obtained by the unreasonable invasion was
therefore inadmissible under the Montana exclusionary rule.3 The case was
reversed and remanded for a new trial excluding the testimony of the
overheard conversation.
The Brecht decision marks a significant departure from the general
rule of admissibility of evidence obtained in a search and seizure by a
private individual, and in the application of the fourth amendment ex-
clusionary rule.4
Under the common law rule, the admissibility of evidence was not
affected by the means through which it was obtained, regardless of whether
it was procured by a government agent or a private person. 5 This common
law rule has been changed to a very large extent since the turn of the
century, with the advent of the exclusionary rule. The rule had its origin
in 1914, when the Supreme Court held that evidence obtained in an un-
lawful search and seizure by federal officers must be excluded in federal
criminal trials.6 Later, in 1960, the Supreme Court extended this rule to
include unreasonable searches and seizures conducted by state agents.?
1. -Mont.-, 485 P.2d 47 (1971).
2. Id. at-, 485 P.2d at 50.
3. Id. Although the decision turned upon the error in admitting Sandra
Brumfield's testimony, the court also dealt with a problem concerning the Miranda
warning to prevent error on retrial. The discussion of this issue is beyond the
scope of this note.
4. See 29 Am. JuL. 2D Evidence § 417 (1967); 79 C.J.S. Search and Seizures
§ 5 (c) (1952).
5. 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 408 (1967).
6. Weeks v. United States, 282 U.S. 383 (1914).
7. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
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Finally, in 1961, the exclusionary rule was imposed on state courts in cases
where evidence was unlawfully seized by state agents. 8
While this great change was taking place in the area of admissibility
of evidence obtained in illegal searches conducted by governmental agents,
the common law rule concerning illegal searches by private individuals has
remained unchanged since 1921, when the Supreme Court decided Burdeau
v. McDowell.0 The Burdeau case involved private investigators who broke
into a defendant's office, blew open his safe door, and took incriminating
papers. The papers were subsequently used as evidence in a criminal trial
for fraudulant use of the mails. The Supreme Court affirmed the admission
of the papers into evidence, stating that the fourth amendment applied
only to sovereign authority and did not restrain unlawful conduct by
private individuals.' 0 The holding of this case has continued to be the
ruling precedent up to the present day.
The most common area where the courts have admitted evidence
obtained by private individuals during illegal searches is when the evidence
was discovered accidentally by a person not involved in any police investi-
gation. Accidentally found evidence can come up in a number of different
ways. For example, in Duran v. United Stales" a motel room maid clean-
ing up a room for a new guest found several ounces of heroin, which was
later used as evidence in a prosecution for receiving and concealing heroin.
Similarly, marijuana discovered in an automobile by a parking lot attend-
ant was used to convict a defendant for possession in State v. Bryan.'2 Mis-
souri upheld the admission of evidence obtained in this manner in State v.
Brown,' where a landlord entered a tenant's apartment and accidentally
found parts from stolen cars.
The admissibility of accidentally found evidence is easy to justify. The
people who discover the evidence are working at their job and have no
motive in trying to incriminate the defendant. As stated in Elkins v. United
States,14 "the [exclusionary] rule is calculated to prevent not to repair. Its
purpose is to deter....,"1 5 When dealing with an accidental discovery this
deterrent effect is not applicable.
Evidence discovered by private individuals who are actually trying to
uncover incriminating evidence has also been held admissible in the
majority of jurisdictions. A large number of these cases involve a situation
where the searcher is the victim of a crime and is trying to retrieve stolen
goods or find the person responsible. Thus, evidence obtained by an em-
ployer who searched his employee's car because he was suspected of steal-
ing, 16 and evidence uncovered by a store owner while searching a suspected
burglar's car,17 has been held to be admissible.
8. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
9. 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
10. Id. at 475.
11. 413 F.2d 596 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 917 (1969).
12. 1 Ore. App. 15, 457 P.2d 661 (1969).
13. 391 S.W.2d 903 (Mo. 1965).
14. 864 U.S. 206 (1960).
15. Id. at 217.
16. People v. Johnson, 153 Cal. App. 2d 870, 315 P.2d 468 (1957).
17. Colburn v. State, 175 Miss. 704, 166 So. 920 (1936).
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Missouri again follows the majority view and allows evidence discovered
in this manner to be used in criminal actions. In State v. Overby,'8 evidence
obtained from citizens who had made a citizens' arrest was tested as to its
admissibility. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that federal and Mis-
souri constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures
apply to governmental action only and allowed the evidence to be used.19
Although most courts admit evidence obtained by private individuals,
the exclusionary rule is strictly applied when any kind of governmental
assistance is used. It is often very easy for the courts to find such assistance.
Examples would be when a federal agent directs an airline employee to
open a package in his control,2 0 or when a detective accompanies a land-
lady to search a room, directing her where to search.21
A much more difficult situation arises when there is very little direct
police activity. In Thacker v. Commonwealth,22 the police appealed to
the citizens of a community to help find a murder suspect. The suspect was
found and, pursuant to a citizens' arrest, the man was searched and a pistol
was found. The appellate court reversed his conviction for carrying a con-
cealed weapon, stating that the citizens making the arrest were acting for
and on behalf of the sovereignty. 23 The search and seizure provisions of
the constitution have also been applied when the searcher was paid directly
by the police or a government agent. 24
The Missouri courts have been similarly strict in enforcing the ex-
clusionary rule when the search was tainted by governmental activity. In a
recent supreme court decision the court ruled that a city marshal, outside
his jurisdiction, was not a private citizen but was either acting in his official
capacity or acting under a posse comitaties. Evidence illegally obtained by
him was excluded. 25
Following this trend in the case law, it is possible that any time the
police warn the public concerning a crime which has been committed, or
put up a wanted poster offering money for information, the state is actually
making the public its agent and thus evidence illegally obtained through
private help will be excluded.
Searches conducted by private investigators are not easily classified as
either public or private. On one hand, the admission of evidence obtained
illegally by private investigators is hard to justify as an exception to the
exclusionary rule. The investigator is paid to search for incriminating evi-
dence, and his work may involve searches to find evidence which can later
be used in a criminal prosecution. On the other hand, the investigator is
normally acting not on behalf of the state but at the request and under
18. 432 S.W.2d 277 (Mo. 1968).
19. Id. at 279. See also State v. Hepperman, 349 Mo. 681, 162 S.W.2d 878(1942), where the court said that the constitutional restraint applies only to gov-
ernment action.
20. Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966).
21. People v. Fierro, 236 Cal. App. 2d 344, 46 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1965).
22. 310 Ky. 702, 221 S.W.2d 682 (1949).
23. Id. at 704, 221 S.W.2d at 683.
24. In Hajdu v. State, 189 So. 2d 230 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966), a search by a
private detective, paid by the State Board of Medical Examiners, was held un-
reasonable and the evidence obtained held inadmissible.
25. State v. Goodman, 449 S.W.2d 656 (Mo. 1970).
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the direction of a private party. Here again the courts have consistently
followed the Burdeau decision and held evidence illegally obtained by
private individuals such as insurance investigators,2 6 store detectives,2 7 and
security guards2S to be admissible.
In State v. Brecht the Montana Supreme Court, instead of finding the
evidence obtained by Sandra admissible under the rules just discussed, held
the use of her testimony to be reversible error. In reaching this conclusion
the Montana court cited the Supreme Court decision of Katz v. United
States20 as establishing the principle that the search and seizure provision
of the fourth amendment protects persons and their right to privacy.3 0 The
court reasoned that Sandra's listening in on the phone extension was a vio-
lation of Brecht's right to privacy, a constitutional right, which, when
broken, evoked the exclusionary rule. The court said that to hold otherwise
would create a "fictional distinction" between classes of citizens: those
who are bound to respect the Constitution and those who are not.31
The state acknowledged the defendant's right to privacy but contended
that he was protected only against violations by law enforcement officers
and not violations by private citizens. As the Supreme Court stated in the
Burdeau case:
The Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches
and seizures. . . . Its origin and history clearly show that it was
intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority,
and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than gov-
ernmental agencies .... 3 2
A careful reading of the Katz decision does reveal a warning about the
constitutional right to privacy. But the Court stated that the fourth
amendment cannot be translated into a general right to privacy but only
privacy from governmental intrusions, and that the general right to privacy
is left to the laws of the state.33
26. E.g., State v. Hughes, 8 Ariz. App. 366, 446 P.2d 472, cert. denied, 395 U.S.
940 (1968).
27. E.g., People v. Randazzo, 220 Cal. App. 2d 768, 386 P.2d 671, 34 Cal.
Rptr. 65, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1000 (1963).
28. E.g., People v. Trimarco, 41 Misc. 2d 775, 245 N.Y.S.2d 795 (Sup. Ct.
1963).
29. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
30. See id. at 350-51.
31. -Mont.-, 485 P.2d at 50-51. The majority opinion also stated that a
fourth amendment violation offended fifth amendment guarantees against self-
incrimination. Katz and Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946), were cited in
support of this proposition. Although no mention of this could be found in Katz,
the Court in Davis stated:
The law of search and seizures as revealed in the decisions of this
Court is the product of the interplay of these two constitutional provisions.
It reflects a dual purpose-protection of the privacy of the individual, his
right to be let alone; protection of the individual against compulsory
production of evidence to be used against him.
Davis v. United States, supra at 587 (citations omitted). However, here again the
Supreme Court was dealing with actions taken by federal agents and made no
mention of searches conducted by private individuals.
32. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
33. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967).
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From the preceding discussion it can be seen that the rule of admissi-
bility of evidence obtained from illegal searches by private individuals is
firmly embedded in the case law. The Supreme Court has not changed its
position since 1921, and has continually denied certiorari when confronted
with similar fact situations.3 4 It has been argued that the Burdeau decision
has been greatly weakened or overruled by Elkins v. United States, but this
argument has not found favor in the courts 5 Additionally, some writers
have argued that the exclusionary rule could be applied to the private
search area through extension of the fourteenth amendment "state action"
theory.3 6 This argument is based on Shelly v. Kraemer,3 7 which held the
enforcement by state courts of racially discriminatory restrictive covenants
made between private parties to be an unlawful extension of state action.
The theory is that the admission of unconstitutionally seized evidence in a
state court is also an unlawful extension of state action under the Shelly
rationale.38 However, as one writer has pointed out, Shelly can be dis-
tinguished from a private search and seizure case because the court is not
forcing a private party to do an act which the state could not constitutionally
perform itself; rather, it is only allowing illegally seized information into
evidence.89 In light of this distinction, and the firm establishment of the
Burdeau precedent, it seems unlikely that the Montana Supreme Court de-
cision in Brecht-that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule is applicable
to private searches-will be followed in the future in other jurisdictions.
CHmuLms A. WBER
34. See e.g., Duran v. United States, 413 F.2d 596 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 917 (1969); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 431 Pa. 512, 246 A.2d 325, cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 937 (1968).
35. See United States v. Goldberg, 330 F.2d 30 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 953 (1964), and the text accompanying notes 14-15 supra. See also United
States v. McGuire, 381 F.2d 306 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1053 (1967).36. See 46 MINN. L. Rrzv. 1119 (1962); see also 19 DRAKE L. Rxv. 476 (1970).
37. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
38. 46 MINN. L. REv. 1119, 1124 (1962).
39. Id. at 1125.
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PRISONS-ESCAPE-NECESSITY AS A DEFENSE
State v. Green'
While serving a three year sentence for burglary, John Charles Green
escaped from the Missouri Training Center for Men at Moberly. Green
was charged with the offense of escape from a state institution.2 By agree-
ment of the parties, defendant made an offer of proof in which he asserted
the defense of justifiable escape because of (1) unconstitutional conditions
of confinement, and (2) necessity to escape so as to avoid death or serious
bodily injury.
Defendant offered to prove that shortly after becoming an inmate at
the training center he was attacked and homosexually raped in his cell at
night by two inmates who picked the lock to his cell door. Immediately
thereafter defendant feigned suicide by injuring himself and was taken
to the prison hospital where he reported the assault and requested protec-
tion. The Assistant Superintendent of Treatment admonished the defendant
to return and defend himself. Upon release, defendant was returned to the
same cell. Two weeks later three inmates entered defendant's cell, knocked
him unconscious and raped him. Upon regaining consciousness defendant
again feigned suicide in order to contact prison officials. This time he was
taken before the disciplinary board for attempted self-destruction. He in-
formed the board of the assaults, again requested protection, and was given
a cell change. One of the board members, the Assistant Superintendent of
Custody, told defendant that the alternatives were to defend himself, submit
to the assaults or "go over the fence."
Three months later, during the noon hour on the day of the escape,
four or five inmates told defendant they would return to his cell that night
to make him a "punk" (a person who plays the female role in homosexual
relations) for the remainder of his term at the training center. The inmates
threatened to kill or seriously injure defendant if he refused to submit.
That evening defendant escaped from the training center. During the three
month period between the second assault and the day of the escape, de-
fendant's only other homosexual encounter was a propositioning by a train-
ing center guard.
At the conclusion of the offer of proof the trial court ruled that the
evidence did not constitute a defense, whereupon defendant waived a jury
and was tried and convicted by the court. On appeal, the Missouri Supreme
Court affirmed.8
When used as a defense to criminal prosecution, necessity is closely
related to two other types of compulsion: coercion and duress. Although
both courts and writers often avoid definitions or define these defenses in
terms of their requirements, limitations or results, it is possible to extract
from the case law and writings some generally accepted definitions.
Traditionally, necessity in the criminal law was said to be compulsion
exerted by physical (or natural), as opposed to human forces. Under this
definition a state of necessity resulted from an Act of God or unavoidable
I. 470 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. En Banc 1971).
2. See generally § 557.351, RSMo 1969.
3. 470 S.W.2d at 565.
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accident accompanied by circumstances compelling the actor to do an un-
lawful act.4 According to Professor Hall, "[T]he harm, to be justified,
must have been committed under pressure of physical forces." 5 Thus, the
early cases dealt mainly with emergencies at sea. The two leading cases are
United States v. Holmes6 and Regina v. Dudley,7 both involving crimes
committed by victims of shipwrecks.
Coercion was originally the term used to describe the presumed com-
pulsion of a married woman who committed a crime in the presence of
her husband. 8 Today, however, this "has become little more than a vestige
of the medieval conception of marriage,"9 and the term coercion is no
longer limited to such a narrow scope of application. A more modern
definition states that coercion "means 'compulsion,' forcible constraint; the
act of compelling by force or arms."' 0
Duress has been similarly defined, as "unlawful constraint exercised
upon a man whereby he is forced to do some act that he otherwise would
not have done."" Although duress and coercion have been distinguished,' 2
the two terms are generally used synonymously, and most writers use one
or the other term as encompassing both.' s
Analysis of this area of law is difficult because of the confused treat-
ment of these defenses in both the case law and in writings on the subject."
4. Hershey &c Avins, Compulsion as a Defense to Criminal Prosecution, 11
OxLA. L. REv. 288 (1958).
5. J. HALT, GNFA_ L PRmCiPLES OF CnmwA LAw 426 (2d ed. 1960).
6. 26 F. Cas. 360 (No. 15383) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (recognized necessity tojettison passengers in lifeboat after shipwreck, provided a fair method of selection
used)'7. 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884) (shipwreck victims found guilty of killing a passenger
in lifeboat for food even though all passengers in lifeboat would otherwise have
died before being rescued).
8. Perkins, The Doctrine of Coercion, 19 IowA L. REV. 507 (1934); Annots.,
71 A.L.R. 1116 (1931), 4 A.L.R. 266 (1919).
9. J. HALL, supra note 5, at 437.
10. Fluharty v. Fluharty, 38 Del. 487, 490, 193 A. 838, 839 (Super. Ct. 1937).
11. BLAcK's LAW DIcrnoNA.Y 594 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
12. In McKenzie-Hague Co. v. Carbide & Carbon Chem. Co., 73 F.2d 78 (8th
Cir. 1934) it was stated:
The words "coercion" and "duress" are not synonymous, although their
meanings often shade into one another. "Duress" generally carries the idea
of compulsion, either by means of actual physical force or threatened
physical force applied to the person (or to some near relative of the person)
to be influenced, or applied to the property or reputation of such person.
"Coercion" may include a compulsion brought about by moral force
or in some other manner, with or without physical force. Id. at 82-83.
A similar distinction, indicating that coercion is broader than duress was made
in Fluharty v. Fluharty, 38 Del. 487, 491, 193 A. 838, 840 (Super. Ct. 1937). An-
other court stated that "the word 'duress' as employed in civil law, is not synony-
mous with the term 'coercion' as employed in the criminal law." Montford v.
State, 144 Ga. 582, 585, 87 S.E. 797, 798 (1961). See also J. HALL, supra note 5,
at 437. Still another distinction often made is that duress is limited to situations
where one is asked (forced) to commit the crime charged. See, e.g., People v.
Richards, 269 Cal. App. 2d 768, 75 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1969).
13. 1 W. Buanica, LAw OF Cmim 260 (1946); R. PERKIs, CanLNu.i LAw
951 (2d ed. 1969); 1 F. WHARTON, WH"TON'S CanmmNw. LAw AND Paocmnuar 261
(1957); G. WILUAms, Clan L LAW 751 (2d ed. 1961).
14. J. HALL, supra note 5, at 416.
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This confusion may be primarily attributed to (1) the fact that all three
defenses are generally agreed to have certain common requirements, result-
ing in frequent interchangeable use of the three terms, and (2) disagreement
as to the requirements and limitations of a particular defense. In other
words, certain requirements are generally thought to be applicable to any
of the defenses, and at the same time there is disagreement over require-
ments when speaking of any one of the particular defenses.
A limitation often stated to be applicable to all the defenses in ques-
tion is that none will excuse the taking of an innocent life.1 5 Some courts
extend this exemption to capital crimes in general.' 6 Another requirement
shared by all the defenses is that the danger sought to be avoided be present,
imminent and impending; in other words, a threat of future harm will not
excuse.' 7 Further, it is also generally required that one exhaust all alterna-
tives. That is, the compulsion must be of such a nature as to leave one
with no reasonable opportunity to avoid doing the unlawful act.'8
As an example of the disagreement over requirements for a particular
defense, most definitions of necessity speak not in terms of fear of death
or serious bodily harm, but rather require that the harm or evil sought to
be avoided by such conduct be greater than that sought to be prevented
by the law defining the offense charged.' 9 The actor is simply required to
choose the lesser of evils,20 regardless of what the evils are. The courts, how-
ever, have not consistently applied a choice of evils test for necessity, and
have sometimes required fear of death or serious bodily harm, particularly
in the older cases. 21 Furthermore, the requirement has not been strictly
adhered to in cases of coercion or duress.2 2 A probable reason for this is
that a necessary corollary to this requirement would be that a threat to one's
property would never excuse;23 it seems unlikely that any court would re-
15. United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360 (No. 153883) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842);
R. PERKINS, supra note 13, at 957; Hershey &c Avins, supra note 4; Annot., 40
A.L.R.2d 908 (1955). However, it was stated in Holmes that necessity would even
justify taking an innocent life if a fair method of selection (e.g., casting lots) was
used to determine those who should die in a shipwreck situation.
16. See, e.g., State v. Dowell, 106 N.C. 722, 726, 11 S.E. 525, 526 (1890).
17. People v. Richards, 269 Cal. App. 2d 768, 778, 75 Cal. Rptr. 597, 604(1969); Hall v. State, 136 Fla. 644, 684, 187 So. 392, 409 (1939); State v. St. Clair,
262 S.W.2d 25, 27-28 (Mo. 1953); State v. Davis, 14 Nev. 439, 33 Am. R. 563(1880); 1 W. ButDicK, supra note 13, at 262; 1 F. WHARTON, supra note 13, at 263;
G. WiLLmis, supra note 13, at 729.
18. Dempsey v. United States, 283 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1960); R. 1. Recreation
Center v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir. 1949); State v. St. Clair,
262 S.W.2d 25, 27-28 (Mo. 1953); R. PERKINS, supra note 13, at 954; 1 F. WHARTON,
supra note 13 at 268-64, 403-04; Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 908, 911 (1955).
19. People v. Richards, 269 Cal. App. 2d 768, 777, 75 Cal. Rptr. 597, 604
(1969); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Commonwealth, 119 Ky. 519, 527, 84 S.W. 566, 568
1905); J. HALL, supra note 5, at 426.
20. See MoDEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Prop. Off. Draft, 1962).
21. 1 W. BuRmDi, supra note 13, at 262.
22. See Perryman v. State, 63 Ga. App. 819, 12 S.E.2d 388 (1940). In Peny-
man a young boy was held to be acting under duress when he submitted to sodomy
as a result of threats by an older man to slap the boy every time he saw him.
23. 1 W. BueDicK, supra note 18, at 262-63; R. PERuNIs, supra note 13, at 954;
1 F. WHARTON, supra note 13, at 263.
[Vol. 37
28
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [1972], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol37/iss3/6
RECENT CASES
quire danger of death or serious bodily harm in all cases, 24 but rather would
decide the applicability of the defense based on the facts of a particular
case. This results in applying a "choice of evils" test for coercion and
duress, as in necessity. In other words, courts have sometimes, but not
always, required fear of death or serious bodily harm for all three defenses.
Thus, there is functionally little difference among necessity and coercion
or duress, because the courts have failed to consistently impose the same
requirements on each particular defense. Indeed, the court in Green, in
dealing with necessity, resolved the issue against the defendant by reference
to a case stating the requirements for coercion,25 indicating the Missouri
Supreme Court considers the terms to be at least functionally synonymous.
It should be apparent that it is often difficult to analyze a particular
case which characterizes a defense in terms of one of these three types of
compulsion. A better approach, it is submitted, would be similar to
that embodied in the Model Penal Code, which provides affirmative de-
fenses for duress (encompassing coercion), and justification generally (ne-
cessity). Both apply a choice of evils test.2 6 Neither of these defenses
requires a fear of death or serious bodily harm,2 7 nor are capital crimes ex-
cluded.28 Rather, they are defenses of general validity. Although the duress
defense requires the threat to be to the person of the actor or another, and
specifically disallows the defense where the threat is merely to property
or reputation,29 such a case comes within the defense of justification gen-
erally. 30 The defense of justification generally also resolves the "imminent
and impending" problem, by excusing only "conduct which the actor
believes to be necessary to avoid an evil to himself or to another .... ."a'
The immediacy of a situation is simply a factor in determining the genuine-
ness of the actor's belief in the necessity of his conduct.82 Similarly, the
duress defense makes the imminency of the danger merely a factor to be
considered, among others.33
In spite of the recognized existence of the defenses of necessity3 4 and
24. Perkins contends that this requirement is merely dicta in the decided
cases, and states: "No case has ever decided that the threat to burn a man's housedown would not be recognized as an excuse for what otherwise would be petit
larceny, or a mild battery." R. PERENs, supra note 13, at 960.
25. State v. St. Clair, 262 S.W.2d 25 (Mo. 1953).
26. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.09, 3.02 (Prop. Off. Draft, 1962).
27. MODEL Pr.NA CODE § 2.09, comment at 7 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960);§ 3.02, comment at 7 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
28. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09, comment at 8 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960);§ 3.02, comment at 7 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
29. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09, comment at 7 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
30. MODEL PrNAL CODE § 3.02, comment at 9 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
31. Id. § 3.02 (emphasis added).
32. Id. § 3.02, comment at 10.
33. MODEL PEN.AL CODE § 2.09, comment at 8 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
34. See United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360 (No. 15383) (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1842), which recognized the necessity to jettison a ship's passengers, if done fairly,
and State v. Jackson, 71 N.H. 552, 53 A. 1021 (1902), which recognized the neces-
sity to keep a sick child home from school without the school board's advance per-
mission. See also 1 W. BuRamcx, supra note 13, at 262.
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coercion or duress,3 5 there are relatively few cases on coercion or duress, and
even fewer cases dealing with necessity. Necessity, particularly, is allowed
only in clear cases. 86 In Missouri, prior to Green, there were apparently no
cases dealing with necessity and the first reported Missouri case on coercion
or duress was decided in 1953.37 One likely reason for this paucity of cases
may be prosecutorial discretion. It may be that prosecutors often simply
do not prosecute in cases where the defenses in question would be approp-
riate. Further, it is not known how often these defenses are successfully in-
voked at the trial level and subsequently not appealed or reported.8 8 Some
writers, however, attribute the lack of cases to judicial suspicion and hos-
tility with regard to these defenses.3 9
Reluctance to allow these defenses is nowhere stronger than in cases
involving escape from prison. Some cases have recognized the defense of
necessity as applicable to escape from prison, but there are apparently no
reported cases where such a defense has been successful. For example, the
court in State v. Palmer40 recognized the defense in dictum when it stated:
Should a prison catch fire or a live steam pipe burst in a block
of cells, a prisoner would be obviously justified in effecting an
escape to save his life; and if he then promptly surrendered as
soon as he was free of his immediate danger, as would be his duty,
it would be inconceivable that he would thereafter be prosecuted
for the technical escape. 41
But, in Dempsey v. United States,42 defendant, a diabetic, claimed his
escape was justified because he was in immediate need of insulin. His con-
viction was affirmed because the defendant had neither informed the prison
authorities of his condition nor made a request for relief. 43 Similarly, the
court in State v. Davis44 affirmed the escape conviction of a defendant who
claimed justification because of the unwholesome conditions of the jail in
35. See R. 1. Recreation Center v. Aetna Cas. &s Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603 (1st
Cir. 1949); State v. St. Clair, 262 S.W.2d 25 (Mo. 1953); 1 F. WHARToN, supra note
13, at 261.
36. 1 W. Bumncx, supra note 13, at 262.
37. State v. St. Clair, 262 S.W.2d 25 (Mo. 1953).
38. Cf. the unreported case of State v. Wootten, discussed in Note, The Law
of Necessity as Applied in the Bisbee Deportation Case, 3 ARiz. L. Rv. 264 (1961).
39. J. HALL, supra note 5, at 443-44. In the trial judge's ruling on an offer of
proof in the unreported case of State v. Wootten it was stated:
The cases are and must be rare and conditions exceptional in which such
a rule may be invoked. . . . Naturally the first impression the mind
entertains is that such a defense is rather a desperate attempt to escape the
consequences of criminal conduct than a bona fide excuse for such conduct.
21 COLuTm. L. R rv. 71, 73 n.19 (1921).
40. 45 Del. 308, 72 A.2d 442 (1950).
41. Id. at 311, 72 A.2d at 444.
42. 283 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1960).
43. It is questionable whether the court in Dempsey in fact recognized neces-
sity as a defense to prison escape. The court stated:
Even if we were to assume, contrary to the well established general rule...
that intolerable conditions endangering the safety or life of an inmate
would be a defense... we are convinced that no such showing was here
made.... Id. at 934.
44. 14 Nev. 439, 33 Am. R. 563 (1880).
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which he was confined. The court in Davis recognized necessity as a defense
to escape but held that it could excuse only when the prisoner first had
exhausted all lawful methods of obtaining relief. 45 Thus, the defendant in
Green proceeded with the defense of necessity on extremely meager
authority.
As a general proposition unwholesome, intolerable, or even unconsti-
tutional conditions of confinement will not justify escape from prison.48
Although many earlier cases held that escape was justified where the pro-
ceedings leading to confinement were illegal,47 the trend in recent years
appears to be that even illegal confinement resulting from irregular pro-
ceedings is no excuse for escape where the imprisonment is under color
of law.48 In addition, there are recent cases involving factual situations
very similar to that in Green in which the defense of necessity was rejected.
People v. Noble49 held that it was no defense that the defendant escaped
from a prison work farm to avoid homosexual attacks by other prisoners.
The court in Noble flatly rejected the defense, apparently for policy rea-
sons, and stated that:
The problem of homosexuality in the prisons is serious and per-
plexing.... However, the answer to the problem is not the judicial
sanctioning of escapes .... The solution must rather come from
some kind of penological reform.50
People v. Richards5 ' disallowed a defense of coercion and duress where
defendant claimed he was threatened with death unless he submitted to
homosexual acts. In Richards, as in Green, defendant's attempts to obtain
help from the prison staff had resulted in advice to "grow up and fight
back." 52
45. The court stated:
A person confined by the law should be delivered by the law; and no
other means can be justified in any case until the officers in charge, and
the law, refuse him relief.... Id. at 444, 33 Am. R. at 564-65.
46. State v. Rentschler, 444 S.W.2d 453 (Mo. 1969); State v. Hart, 411 S.W.2d
143 (Mo. 1967); State v. Pace, 402 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. 1966); State v. King, 372
S.W.2d 857 (Mo. 1963); State v. Palmer, 45 Del. 308, 72 A.2d 442 (1950).
47. Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d 1433-84 (1960).
48. Bayless v. United States, 141 F.2d 578 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 322 U.S.
748 (1944); Aderhold v. Soileau, 67 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1933); State v. Croney, 425
S.W. 65 (Mo. 1968); State v. Hart, 411 S.W.2d 143 (Mo. 1967).
49. 18 Mich. App. 800, 170 N.W.2d 916 (1969).
50. Id. at 303, 170 N.W.2d at 918.
51. 269 Cal. App. 2d 768, 75 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1969).
52. Id. at 771 n.4, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 600 nA. The value of this case as precedent
is clouded by the fact that a statute was involved. The Richards court distinguished
between necessity and duress, and stated that only duress, as embodied in the
penal code, was a defense in California. Id. at 773, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 601. The
California Penal Code deals with lack of capacity to commit a crime when a
person acts "under threats or menaces sufficient to show that they had reasonable
cause to and did believe their lives would be endangered if they refused" CAL.
PENAL CODE § 26(8) (West 1969) (emphasis added). The court in Richards held
that the defendant failed to meet this statutory test because (1) the coercion was
not aimed at getting defendant to escape, but to commit sodomy, and (2) because
the statute required a fear of death, which defendant could have avoided by sub-
mitting to sodomy. 269 Cal. App. 2d at 773-74, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 601-02. The court
went on, however, and said that even if the common law defense of necessity were
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It seems clear that the decisions in these cases are based heavily on
public policy grounds. On one hand it has been argued that public policy
requires that any defendant be allowed to present a defense of necessity
or coercion to a jury. It has been said that
[n]o one ought to be punished for committing a crime under the
unlawful compulsion of another, unless it would be better for
society had the accused resisted the compulsion, in spite of the
possible consequences to himself, rather than commit the crime.5 3
Hall argues the "inutility of punishment for action under extreme necessity
or compulsion. Thus it is asked, how can the fear of future legal punish-
ment equal that of imminent death?" 54 Should the fear of possible future
punishment for escape have been expected to deter Green from escaping
in the face of possible death if he resisted, or serious bodily harm (rape)
if he submitted? These are obviously difficult questions.
On the other side of the public policy question is the argument that
prison administration is difficult under normal conditions, and would
become virtually impossible if each prisoner were allowed to determine
for himself the legality of his confinement. Prisoners are expected to use
accepted methods for gaining freedom or obtaining relief from intolerable
conditions. Prison breaks are extremely disruptive of prison discipline and
routine.5 5 In addition, there is the substantial danger of injury to guards,
policemen and those private citizens who may come in contact with a
desperate escapee.66 Fear that such a defense, if allowed in escape cases,
might be abused was a concern in People v. Noble, where the court expressed
the belief that it was "easy to visualize a rash of escapes, all rationalized by
unverifiable tales of sexual assault." 57 Thus, for practical reasons courts
have generally resolved the public policy argument against escapees.
Green's appeal, however, was not based solely on unconstitutional
conditions of confinement, which he conceded to be no defense in itself.
Green claimed that his confinement under unconstitutional conditions (due
to the state's failure to protect him from homosexual assaults) combined
with denial of access to the courts to obtain review of these unconstitu-
tional conditions, and the necessity of escape to avoid the homosexual
assaults justified his escape. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction, holding: (1) there was no denial of access to the courts because
defendant had not sought access; (2) defendant was not compelled by
necessity to escape because the threatened danger was not sufficiently close
at hand and because defendant failed to exhaust all available alternatives
to avoid the danger; and (3) defendant's only remaining defense was there-
fore unconstitutional conditions of confinement, which is not a defense to
escape.
available in California, defendant failed to establish the defense because he was
not being pursued closely enough, i.e., the danger of death was not sufficiently im-
minent and impending. Id. at 778, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
53. Hershey & Avins, supra note 4, at 291.
54. J. HALL, supra note 5, at 445.
55. People v. Whipple, 100 Cal. App. 261, 265, 279 P. 1008, 1010 (1929).
56. State v. Palmer, 45 Del. 308, 310, 72 A.2d 442, 444 (1950).
57. People v. Noble, 18 Mich. App. 300, 803, 170 N.W.2d 916, 918 (1969).
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Although the court did not decide the issue, Green's claim that he was
being confined under unconstitutional conditions merits some discussion.
It is well established that prisoners lose some, but not all constitutional
rights. Generally, "[a] prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen
except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by
law."58 Thus, a prisoner obviously loses, for example, his right to travel.
It has been held, however, that the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment follow a person into prison.5 9 Prisons
are required to exercise reasonable care for the safety of prisoners,60 and
have a duty to protect them from assaults by guards or other prisoners. 61
Thus, the question in this case would be whether the training center exer-
cised reasonable care in protecting Green from homosexual assaults. How-
ever, it is not dear what constitutes reasonable care in this area. Although
there is authority that a prison is not required to isolate inmates solely
because of their homosexual inclinations, 2 it is not dear whether a prison
must take lesser steps, such as installing bolt locks on cell doors or provid-
ing extra guards at night, as suggested by Green. In any event, due to the
prevalence of homosexual practices in prisons,6 3 it seems apparent that if
Green's contention that his confinement was unconstitutional because the
state placed him in a position of vulnerability to homosexual attacks was
sustained, it would have to be conceded that most prisoners today are being
unconstitutionally confined. Indeed, some writers have claimed that prison
life in general is unconstitutional.64 Therefore, it seems likely that the
question of whether the prison exercised reasonable care would be decided
in the state's favor.
Closely related to appellant's contention that he was being unconsti-
tutionally confined was his argument that he was denied access to the
courts for redress of these grievances. Defendant claimed such access to be
his constitutional right, and that his escape was justified as the only means
of obtaining that right. He based this contention primarily on the fact that
a training center rule forbade "jail house lawyers" to prepare applications
for post-conviction relief. Johnson v. Avery65 held such a rule to be uncon-
stitutional unless the state provided other sources of legal assistance. De-
fendant claimed no such alternatives were provided by the training center.
The court avoided a decision on the validity of the training center rule
and simply held that Johnson was not applicable to the facts of this case
58. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 448, 445 (6th Cir. 1944).
59. Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327, 331 (M.D. Ala. 1966), affd, 390
U.S. 333 (1968); United States v. Lynch, 94 F. Supp. 1011, 1015 (N.D. Ga. 1950),
aff'd, 189 F.2d 476 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 831 (1951).
60. Muniz v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 542, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Johnson
v. United States, 258 F. Supp. 372, 376 (E.D. Va. 1966).
61. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 448, 445 (6th Cir. 1944); United States v.
Lynch, 94 F. Supp. 1011, 1015 (N.D. Ga. 1950), aff'd, 189 F.2d 476 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 842 U.S. 831 (1951).
62. Muniz v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 542, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Johnson
v. United States, 258 F. Supp. 372, 376 (E.D. Va. 1966).
63. See State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 565, 569 n.1 (Mo. En Banc 1971).
64. See Hirschkop &e Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55
VA. L. Rxv. 795 (1969).
65. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
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because Johnson involved a habeas corpus proceeding in which the de-
fendant himself was "jail house lawyer." By giving such a narrow construc-
tion to Johnson the court in effect held that only a "jail house lawyer," in
a habeas corpus proceeding, can attack the constitutionality of a rule for-
bidding him to practice. The result of such a narrow construction of
Johnson is that an ordinary prisoner (not a "jail house lawyer") is prevented
from gaining access to the courts via habeas corpus in order to argue denial
of that same right. That of course was the point Green was attempting
to make; that prison authorities may perpetuate unconstitutional conditions
(in this case an unconstitutional rule) by preventing prisoners from apply-
ing for writs of habeas corpus.
The court in Green, however, doubtless would have reached the same
conclusion even if it had applied Johnson and declared the training center
rule unconstitutional. The court held that there could be no denial of
access to the courts unless there was an attempt to gain access, and that
no such attempt was made by Green prior to his escape.06 Thus, a prisoner
is required to attempt to gain access to the courts regardless of whether
such access is in fact available. A more rational approach, it seems, would
be to consider the existing factual situation to determine whether such
attempts to gain access would have been successful if made. It seems obvious
that a prisoner will be discouraged from seeking access to courts if he
knows he has no chance of even reaching the courts to present his case.
In considering a defense of necessity to escape in People v. Whipple,67 the
court stated: "If the defense could be admitted at all, it should not be
conditioned on the making of a plainly useless request."68
The court in Green did give consideration to Green's contention that
access to the courts was unavailable but concluded there was access by
way of the mails, which were freely available to defendant. In spite of the
fact that the court was bound to accept defendant's version of the facts as
alleged in his offer of proof, the majority opinion apparently ignored
defendant's claim that a letter mailed by him to the sheriff of the county
where he was convicted was returned to him by prison officials, and that
all out-going letters were normally read by prison officials and returned
if they contained derogatory matters. It is questionable, then, whether
Green, or any other prisoner at the training center in fact had unfettered
mailing privileges.69 Thus, the court, by imposing the requirement that
a prisoner seek access to courts in order to claim denial of such access,
and by assuming, contrary to defendant's claims, that unrestricted mailing
privileges were available to prisoners for making such requests, concluded
66. 470 S.W.2d at 567.
67. 100 Cal. App. 261, 279 P. 1008 (1929).
68. Id. at 266, 279 P. at 1010.
69. Even if unfettered mailing privileges were in fact provided, it would seem
that this would not meet the test of Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). If a
state could satisfy its burden of showing alternatives to "jail house lawyers" by
pointing to the United States mails, the practical impact of Johnson would be
minimal because the mails should be available in any case.
It should also be noted that because this appeal involved the trial courts
ruling on an offer of proof to establish a defense, the appellate court is bound
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there was no denial of access to the courts. By so concluding the court was
able to avoid the important question of whether escape is justified by
denial of access to the courts.
Green's contention that his escape was justified by the necessity to
avoid homosexual assaults was also rejected. The court held that the danger
was not sufficiently close at hand, and that defendant could have avoided
the threatened consequences of his refusal to submit to sodomy by reporting
his predicament to the authorities during the hours between the threat
and the escape.7 0 The dissent argued that these holdings ignore the reali-
ties of the factual situation.7 1 The physical structure of the training center
buildings, combined with the small number of guards on duty at night
resulted in entire wings of the buildings being unsupervised for substantial
periods of time. Under these circumstances, if defendant had waited until
his attackers were dose at hand (which would mean at his door or in his
room, and out of the sight and earshot of the guards), he would have had
no possible chance to escape from five men. A situation such as this illus-
trates the problem with the requirement that the threatened danger be
imminent and impending rather than a threat of future harm. The prob-
lem lies in determining what constitutes "imminent and impending" danger.
The imminent and impending requirement forces a person in Green's
position to wait as long as possible before escaping. Thus, only if one
waits until the last possible moment to escape can the threatened harm
be said to be "imminent and impending." If one escapes before the last
possible moment he is acting under a threat of future harm. It seems diffi-
cult, if not impossible to set a specific point in time which is the "last
possible moment.17 2
The dissent further argued that the majority ignored the realities of
prison life in its holding that defendant could have resolved his problem
by reporting it to the prison authorities.73 It took several days to get
response to a written complaint, and it was difficult to complain to a guard
without the general population learning the identity of the prisoner who
complained, or "snitched." To "snitch" apparently involves a high risk
of death at the hands of other prisoners. Moreover, defendant's previous
complaints to the authorities had met with the advice to fight it out,
submit to sodomy or escape. Defendant, then, had little hope of obtaining
help from the authorities even if he had requested it.
Thus, the majority employed the same analysis for both the denial
70. 470 S.W.2d at 568.
71. Id. at 568 (dissenting opinion).
72. See Newman and Weitzer, who state:
To say that a threat of future harm is not sufficient is to ignore the fact
that the nature of a threat is to hold out a future harm. All danger to
the "duressed" is in the future, for if it were in the present it would no
longer be a danger or a threat but would be an accomplished arm-....
Thus, where the courts have required present danger to life rather than
past or future fear of danger to life, such distinctions are meaningless.
Newman & Weitzer, Duress, Free Will and The Criminal Law, 30 So. CAL. L. REv.
313, 328 (1957). The authors suggest a better approach would be to allow thejury to consider the timing of the threat as one of several factors in determining
whether a person was "coerced."
73. 470 S.W.2d at 568 (dissenting opinion).
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of access to the courts contention and for the necessity argument. On both
issues the court examined the steps taken by defendant to obtain relief
and rejected the argument that further action by defendant would have
been futile. The facts indicate that in all likelihood defendant's attempts
to reach the courts and obtain help from prison authorities would have
been unsuccessful, and that defendant knew this from past experience.
Faced with such a case, it seems unreasonable to require a defendant to
make a useless request for help in order to present his defense to a jury.
Undoubtedly public policy was a consideration in the decision of this
case. As previously explained, there are obviously valid reasons for requir-
ing prisoners to use accepted procedures to obtain freedom or relief from
intolerable conditions of confinement. No doubt the court in Green was
influenced by the fear that, given the widespread incidence of homosexuality
in prisons, there could be an epidemic of escapes where the attempted
justifications would be unverifiable and perhaps fabricated claims of homo-
sexual assaults. 7 ' However, the question is not whether a prisoner should
be allowed to escape from such conditions with impunity. The question
is rather one of whether a defendant in such a case should be allowed to
present his defense to a jury.
A better approach, it is submitted, would be to allow a defendant in
Green's situation to present his defense to a jury. The jury would then
have the task of ferreting out truth from fabrication and, considering all
the facts (only one of which would be the proximity in time of the threat-
ened danger), determine whether the defendant was in fact "coerced" or
acted from "necessity."
If, however, it should be determined that sound public policy requires
that the rights of prisoners to protection from homosexual attacks and
to access to the courts should be subordinated to the interest of society
in maintaining well-ordered prisons, a more forthright approach should
be employed. That is, the law should simply say that necessity is not a
defense to escape from prison. Although the court in Green implicitly recog-
nized necessity as a defense to escape, it is difficult to conceive of a factual
situation in which a prisoner could be pursued closely enough to be in
"imminent" danger and still elude his pursuers, much less escape from
prison. Thus, as a practical matter, necessity is not a defense to escape
from prison in Missouri.
GEoRGE D. NICHOLS
74. See People v. Noble, 18 Mich. App. 300, 303, 170 N.W. 2d 916, 918 (1969).
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WITHOUT REGARD TO FAULT
Gaibreath v. Engineering Construction Corp.'
Engineering Construction Corporation was engaged in blasting opera-
tions near a high pressure gas line owned by Northern Indiana Public
Service Company. One of the blasts allegedly caused the gas line to rupture.
Galbreath, an employee of the gas company, was injured when the es-
caping gas ignited and exploded while he was repairing the ruptured gas
line.
Galbreath based his cause of action for personal injuries on two
theories. First, he contended that the construction company was negligent
in detonating dynamite too close to the gas line and in leaving a backhoe
engine in operation and positioned just above the excavation where the
gas line had been ruptured. Secondly, plaintiff alleged that the defend-
ant's use of dynamite constituted an extra-hazardous activity which imposed
liability without regard to fault upon defendant for injuries resulting
from his act.
The trial court sustained defendant's demurrer to the liability without
fault allegation on the ground that, as a matter of law, plaintiff's injury
was but an indirect result of the blast. On review, plaintiff restated his con-
tention that the construction company was liable, regardless of negligence,
for any injury proximately caused by his blasting operation and that such
liability was not limited to debris or concussion damage. Defendant argued
that liability without fault extended only to damage which is the direct
result of "trespassing" debris or vibration. The Indiana Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court's granting of the demurrer, holding that a person
engaged in an acknowledged extra-hazardous activity is liable for all the
consequences which were a foreseeable result of the activity. The court
dismissed as "artificial" the distinction between direct and indirect results
of extra-hazardous activities, and agreed with plaintiff's contention that it
would be unfair to allow recovery for damage caused by falling debris or
vibrations, without proof of negligence, but deny recovery to a plaintiff
injured by gas escaping from a broken main caused by blasting.2
While scholars disagree on the historical point, it is generally accepted
that the early tort law imposed liability largely without regard to fault.8
While it may not be completely accurate to say that a man always acted at
his peril,4 it is dear that liability was frequently imposed irrespective of
the defendant's innocence.5 A possible explanation for this is the early
law's acknowledged concern for keeping peace between individuals, which
was easily accomplished by providing a remedy that would be accepted in
lieu of private vengeance.6 This early concept subsequently gave way to
the recognition of fault as the primary basis for granting recovery.7 But,
1. 273 N.E.2d 121 (Ind. Ct. App. 1971).
2. Id. at 124.
3. W. PossER, THE LAw oF ToRTs § 4 (4th ed. 1971).
4. Winfield, The Myth of Absolute Liability, 42 L.Q. REv. 37 (1926).
5. W. PRossER, supra note 3, § 75.
6. 0. HOLMES, THE CommoN L W 3 (1881).
7. Ames, Law and Morals, 22 Hazv. L. Rxv. 97 (1908).
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despite this movement, there remained certain areas, such as nuisance and
the keeping of wild animals, where the concept of liability without fault
was retained.8
The modem doctrine of imposing liability without regard to fault for
abnormally dangerous activities developed in the 1866 English case of
Fletcher v. Rylands,9 which involved the flooding of plaintiff's mine by
water escaping from a reservoir on defendant's land. In holding defendant
liable for the damage, Mr. Justice Blackburn ruled that a person bringing
anything onto his land that is likely to do damage if it escapes is liable for
all damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.' 0 According to
Prosser, the rule enunciated by Justice Blackburn was merely an extension
of the principles applicable to the animal and nuisance cases. In other
words, the court's decision was based upon generalizations from these
precedents in light of the facts in Rylands, and was not the formulation of
a novel doctrine of liability.'1 However, it was Lord Cairns, in review of the
decision, who stated the rule that has become widely accepted.' 2 The Cairns
opinion focused on the "non-natural" use of the land as the basis for im-
posing liability without regard to fault, thus limiting Blackburn's broad
statement of the rule.'3 According to the Cairns opinion, the question of
whether or not a particular activity was "non-natural" so as to support
the imposition of liability without fault depended solely on the location
and circumstances in which the particular activity was carried on.14
There has been much debate concerning the degree to which Rylands v.
Fletcher has been accepted in the United States. Reversing his earlier
opinion,' 5 Prosser now contends that the majority of American jurisdictions
have accepted the Rylands doctrine either by name or in fact, and that many
cases in which American courts have refused to apply the doctrine occurred
under circumstances which would have been regarded by the English
courts as a "natural" use of the land.'6 The Restatement of Torts has
limited the Rylands doctrine to "ultrahazardous" activities and ignores the
relationship of an activity to its surroundings.' 7 However, the Restatement
of Torts (Second) appears to be more in line with the Rylands principle in
defining the activity in terms of "abnormally dangerous" as opposed to
"ultrahazardous." It includes as one of the factors to be considered in de-
termining whether or not an activity is abnormally dangerous "whether
the activity is inappropriate to the place where it is carried on."' 8
8. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, §§ 76, 86.
9. L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866).
10. Id. at 279.
11. W. PROSSER, S E.crma Topics ON Tm LAw or ToRTs 138 (1953).
12. Rylands v. Fletcher, L.RL 3 H.L. 830 (1868).
13. Id. at 338.
14. W. PROSSER, SELEcrED Topics ON THE LAw or TomTs 139, 142 (1953).
15. W. PRosSER, THE LAw OF ToTs 452 (1941).
16. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 510. See, e.g., Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co.,
128 Tex. 155, 96 S.W.2d 221 (1936).
17. REsTATEmENT or ToRTs § 19 (1959).
18. R SATEMNT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
The applicable provisions provide:
§ 519. General Principle
(1) One who carries on an Abnormally Dangerous Activity is subject to
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Cases involving the use of explosives for blasting have frequently been
given as an example of the type of activity to which the Rylands doctrine
applies.19 However, nuisance and trespass theories have also been utilized
to hold defendants liable -without considering fault.2 0 Many early American
cases dealing with damage caused by blasting made a sharp distinction be-
tween damage caused by rocks thrown onto plaintiff's premises and dam-
age caused by vibration. In these cases, the courts found liability regardless
of fault for damage caused by falling debris by applying a trespass theory.21
However, plaintiff was required to plead and prove negligence in order to
recover for concussion damage.22 This technical distinction has now largely
been rejected and, today, most jurisdictions hold the defendant strictly
liable for either debris or concussion damage.23
While many jurisdictions hold a blaster liable without regard to fault
for injuries he inflicts, no jurisdiction has held him liable for all the con-
sequences of his activity.24 Professor Harper has expressed the limitations
placed on absolute liability in terms of three factors which must be satis-
fied before a defendant can be held liable in tort for an "abnormally
dangerous" activity.25 The first of these factors concerns the type of harm
threatened. By this it is meant that the defendant is only liable without
fault for consequences which belong to the general class of harms which
make the conduct "extra-hazardous." This general class of harms has, in
the decided cases, been limited to injuries produced by falling debris or the
liability for harm to the person, land, or chattels of another resulting
from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to pre-
vent such harm.(2) Such strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the risk of which
makes the activity abnormally dangerous.
§ 520. Abnormally Dangerous Activities
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following
factors are to be considered:
a) whether the activity involves a high degree of risk of some harm to the
person, land or chattels of others;
b) whether the gravity of the harm which may result from it is likely to
be great;
c) whether the risk cannot be eliminated by the exercise of reasonable
care;
d) whether the activity is not a matter of common usage;
e) whether the activity is inappropriate to the place where it is carried on;
and
f) the value of the activity to the community.
Note (3) The thing which stands out from the cases is that the important
thing is not that it is extremely dangerous in itself, but that it is abnormal-
ly so in relation to its surroundings.
19. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 513-14.
20. For example, Missouri courts have utilized three rationales in holding
defendants liable without fault for blasting: nuisance, trespass, and the Rylands
doctrine without expressly adopting it. Gladden, The Rylands v. Fletcher Doctrine
and Its Standing in Missouri, 18 Mo. L. Rxv. 53, 56 (1955).
21. See, e.g., Hay v. Cohoes County, 2 N.Y. 159 (1849).
22. Booth v. Rome, 140 N.Y. 267, 35 N.E. 592 (1895).
23. W. Paossim, supra note 3, at 514.
24. Id. at 517.
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direct effects of vibrations of the earth or concussions of the sky.28 The
second factor to be considered is the class of persons protected. In most
cases, this factor does not take on much importance since the injury usually
is suffered by adjoining landowners. But, for example, in Klepsch v. Don-
ald,27 where a rock was hurled farther than previous experience had indi-
cated was probable, defendant was held not to be liable for the resulting
damage because there was no reason to expect that plaintiff's premises
would be damaged.2 8 In other words, this distant plaintiff was not within
the chosen class. The third factor concerns the manner of occurrence of the
injury. This is essentially a proximate cause test and suggests that even if
the first two requirements for finding liability without fault are met, de-
fendant will not be held liable unless his act is found to be the legal cause
of the injury.
While Prosser utilizes the same three factors, he recognizes that they
merely represent the practical necessity of restricting liability without re-
gard to fault within reasonable bounds.2 9 Regardiess of the manner in which
the issues are characterized, the result of utilizing these factors has been
to narrow defendant's liability on liability without fault principles to a
greater extent than it is in negligence cases.8 0 This for the most part stems
from the reluctance, based on policy considerations, of the courts to im-
pose liability without fault on a broad basis.8 '
In the instant case, the circumstances leading to plaintiff's injury made
the effect of an intervening causal factor upon the imposition of liability
without fault the issue of significance. Had the injury involved in Gal-
breath resulted from debris or concussion, the court would have encountered
no difficulty in holding defendant strictly liable for plaintiff's injury.8 2
But the fact that the blasting had only set in motion the force producing
the injury, and was not in itself the direct cause, forced the court to de-
termine the limits to which liability without fault extends.
Three previous cases involving the issue of indirect injury resulting
from an intervening factor set in motion by blasting concerned commercially
raised female mink which devoured their young after being subjected to
the vibrations and concussions of defendant's blasting. In Gronn v. Rogers
Construction, Inc.,s8 the court emphasized that defendant's conduct was
classified as hazardous because of the potential for danger resulting from an
explosion, not because of possible psychological effects of vibration and
concussion upon human beings and animals. 4 This conclusion by the
Gronn court, which seemed to stress the "type of harm threatened" factor
26. Foster v. Preston Mill Co., 44 Wash. 2d 440, 268 P.2d 645 (1954).
27. 4 Wash. 436, 30 P. 991 (1892).
28. Id. at 439, 30 P. at 992-93.
29. W. PaossER, supra note 3, § 79.
30. Id. at 517.
31. See McNeal, Use of Explosives and Liability Questions Involved, 23
INs. CouNsEL J. 125, 126 (1956).
32. See Enos Coal Mining Co. v. Schuchart, 243 Ind. 692, 188 N.E.2d 406
1963) (vibration damage); Wright v. Compton, 53 Ind. 337 (1876) (fallingebris).
33. 221 Ore. 226, 350 P.2d 1086 (1960).
34. Id. at 230, 350 P.2d at 1088.
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of the Harper analysis, was supported by similar reasoning in Foster v.
Preston Mill Co.35 The court stated:
The decided cases, as well as common experience indicate that the
thing which makes blasting ultrahazardous is the risk that property
or persons may be damaged or injured by coming into direct con-
tact with flying debris, or by being directly affected by vibrations of
the earth or concussions of the air.36
In Madsen v. East Jordan Irrigation Co.,3 7 the court stressed the "man-
ner of the injury's occurrence" factor, and stated that the intervention of
the mother mink was sufficient to break the chain of causation necessary
to support the allegation of liability without fault.3 8 Thus, the courts in
all of these cases refused to impose liability without fault by finding in
each instance that the perimeter of liability which surrounded the blasting
activity did not encompass the harm incurred by plaintiff. To these courts,
the imposition of an intervening causal factor between the blast and the
resulting injury precluded the defendant's conduct from being classified
as extra-hazardous in relation to the plaintiff's injury. Therefore, the only
avenue of recovery remaining for the plaintiffs was one based on negligence
principles.
The Galbreath court rejected this reasoning and, in doing so, ex-
panded the risk perimeter of extra-hazardous activity to allow considera-
tion of the effect of intervening causal factors in determining whether
liability without fault is available as a means of recovery. To the Indiana
court, the presence of an intervening factor between the blast and the
injury did not prevent plaintiff from recovering without proving negli-
gence. Instead, the court asserted that the application of strict liability in
cases involving both direct and indirect injury must be determined by
applying a foreseeability test; that is, a consideration of whether it was
foreseeable that the injury inflicted would result from the particular ab-
normally dangerous activity.
The practical effect of the holding is to give a plaintiff, injured by
forces other than debris or vibration, a greater chance of reaching the
jury on the ultimate issue of liability. This point can be illustrated by the
"mink cases." Since the female mink were the intervening causal factors
which actually destroyed the mink kittens, the blasting operation was not,
by the courts' definitions, the direct cause of the injury. However, utilizing
the foreseeability test, enunciated in Galbreath, the intervening factor of
the mother mink would not foreclose plaintiff from recovering if the action
of the mink under those circumstances was a foreseeable result of the
blasting (which experience indicates it was). Thus, while plaintiff would
likely suffer a demurrer if the first test were used, his chances of reaching
the jury on the foreseeability question on a liability without fault theory
are substantially increased.
By holding that an intervening factor does not, in itself, prevent plain-
tiff from proceeding upon a liability without fault theory, the Indiana
35. 44 Wash. 2d 440, 268 P.2d 645 (1954).
36. Id. at 445, 268 P.2d at 648.
37. 101 Utah 552, 125 P.2d 794 (1942).
38. Id. at 554, 125 P.2d at 795.
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court has increased the number of situations in which liability can arise
for injuries resulting from blasting operations. While courts have tended
to limit the situations in which liability without proof of negligence ap-
plies by holding that no public policy or social standard was violated, 39
the Indiana court has essentially reversed this policy decision in order to
protect a greater number of persons suffering what may be termed indirect
damages. The court accomplished this by eliminating the requirement that
the injury must result directly from the blast in order for plaintiff to re-
cover without proving negligence. Now, if plaintiff can establish that the
harm, regardless of intervening factors, was a foreseeable result of the
blasting, he can recover without proving negligence.
Missouri courts have consistently held that a person conducting blast-
ing operations is liable regardless of negligence for any damage inflicted by
debris or concussion.4 0 No Missouri case has yet dealt with the issue of a
causal factor intervening between the blast and the injury. Missouri Ap-
proved Instruction 31.08, which is mandatory in blasting cases based on
liability without fault, requires that the jury find the injury to be the
"direct result" of the blasting.4 ' If this language is construed in the con-
text of past decisions, it is likely that the intervention of a causal factor
between the blast and the injury would prevent plaintiff from reaching the
jury on a liability without fault theory. However, the Missouri courts
could interpret "direct" to include an injury resulting from a foreseeable
intervening factor, and thus follow the Galbreath court's lead in broadening
the scope of a defendant's liability for blasting activities.
HowAv C. GOSNELL, JR.
39. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 517.
40. Gladden, The Rylands v. Fletcher Doctrine and Its Standing in Missouri,
18 Mo. L. REv. 53, 56 (1953).
41. Mo. Approved Instr. § 31.03 (2d ed. 1969):
Verdict Directing-Explosives
Your verdict must be for plaintiff if you believe: First, defendant inten-
tionally exploded [dynamite] [TNT], and Second, as a direct result
of such explosion, plaintiff was damaged. (Emphasis added.)
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WITNESSES-MOTION TO EXCLUDE FROM THE
COURTROOM-GUARDIAN AD L1TEM EXEMPT
Keating v. Jerdel
Plaintiff was involved in a traffic collision allegedly caused by two
other motorists-James Gold and Linda Jerde, a minor. Both were joined
as defendants in a resulting tort action, with Linda's father appointed her
guardian ad litem after petition was filed.2 Mr. Jerde had been a passenger
in the automobile driven by his daughter, and was expected to provide
eye-witness testimony at trial. Prior to commencement of trial, Linda
Jerde's attorney moved that the court enforce the rule excluding witnesses
from the courtroom until called to testify. The judge failed to rule on the
motion and no potential witnesses were advised to leave. Later, when
Linda's attorney called Mr. Jerde as a witness, counsel for both plaintiff
and defendant Gold objected to the receipt of his testimony, on the basis
he had violated the witness sequestration rule by remaining in court. The
judge sustained the objection and prevented Mr. Jerde from testifying.
Following an adverse judgment, Linda Jerde appealed, assigning as
error the judge's failure to exempt the guardian ad litem from the se-
questration rule. The Kansas City Court of Appeals reversed and remanded,
holding that the failure to exclude the guardian ad litem from the rule
was prejudicial error.3
Because the issue on appeal was a matter of first impression in Mis-
souri, the court reviewed both the function of a guardian ad litem and
the rule on witness sequestration. The witness sequestration rule is of
ancient origin;4 in fact, it can be traced back to biblical times.5 The main
purpose for the rule is to insure that one prospective witness will not shape
his report or refresh his memory in light of testimony given by others.6
Akin to this preventive purpose, the rule also helps reveal latent incon-
sistencies, as well as suspicious consistencies, in the testimony of several
individuals.7 The use of nearly identical phraseology by several witnesses
1. 472 S.W.2d 651 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971).
2. § 517.190, RSMo 1969.
3. 472 S.W.2d at 655.
4. See 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1837, at 347 (3d ed. 1940).
5. The story of Daniel's judgment in Susanna s Case is told in the apocryphal
Scriptures. Susanna, wife of Joacim, was wrongfully accused of adultery by two
frustrated suitors. They claimed to have witnessed certain adulterous acts between
Susanna and another young man during a rendezvous in Joacim's garden. After
making their initial charges together, Daniel demanded: 'Put these two aside, one
far from another, and I will examine them." Separately, he asked each: "Under
what tree sawest thou them companying together?" The first answered: "Under a
mastick tree," and the other contradicted: "Under an holm tree." Susanna's reputa-
tion was saved. Daniel 13: 51-53 (Apocrypha); 6 J. WmoMRE, supra note 4, § 1837,
at 347-48.
6. Louisville & N.R.R. v. York, 128 Ala. 805, 310, 80 So. 676, 678 (1902);
Speshoits v. Codanes, 311 Ky. 547, 552, 224 S.W.2d 653, 656 (Ct. App. 1949);
State v. Zellers, 7 N.J.L. 220, 226 (Sup. Ct. 1824); Commonwealth v. Turner, 371
Pa. 417, 427-28, 88 A.2d 915, 920-21 (1952); Wisener v. Maupin, 61 Tenn. (2
Baxt.) 342, 357 (1872); Huddleston v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 400, 405, 61 S.E.2d
276, 279 (1950).
7. 6 J. WMoRE, supra note 4, § 1838, at 352.
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in describing a given circumstance is much more indicative of a conspired
fabrication if they have not heard each other testify.8 Furthermore, the rule
aids the cross-examiner in trapping an untruthful witness who is ignorant
of other conflicting testimony.9 Some authorities suggest sequestration is
imperative when a party plans to use a large number of witnesses, for in
this situation the other party needs every available psychological and
tactical advantage.' 9
Despite the utility of the sequestration rule, several principles conflict
and interfere with its effectiveness. First, trial court discretion in granting
the motion" has been diminished in some jurisdictions by appellate court
holdings that a positive indication of conspiracy or similar wrongdoing
should exist among the witnesses before separation is appropriate.' 2
Further, parties to the action are often mandatorily exempted from the
rule.18 Several courts have held that a party's constitutional right in criminal
prosecutions to confront witnesses and confer with counsel14 also attaches
in civil litigation.'6 In the St. Louis Court of Appeals case of H. T. Simon-
Gregory Dry Goods Co. v. McMahan'6 this right was even extended to in-
clude non-party beneficiaries of a chattel mortgage under litigation. This
case held that any person pecuniarily interested in the trial of a cause,
whether or not a party, has a constitutional right to be present during the
hearing.17 Thus, Missouri has joined several other jurisdictions in recog-
nizing the right of some "parties in interest" to remain at the trial.'8
As a practical matter, exclusion of a party might be futile since he may
already be familiar with the expected testimony of other witnesses from an
earlier reading of their depositions.19 Nevertheless, courts in a minority of
jurisdictions recognize a danger in exempting party-witnesses from the
8. Goldstein, The Exclusion (Separation) of Witnesses, 5 TR. LAWYER'S
GurmE 341, 342 (1961).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 341.
11. See e.g., Berberet v. Electric Park Amusement Co., 310 Mo. 655, 664, 276
S.W. 36, 38 (1925); Noone v. Olehy, 279 Ill. 160, 130 N.E. 476 (1921). But see
Hughes v. State, 126 Tenn. 40, 89, 148 S.W. 543, 555 (1912), where the court in-
dicated that when an affidavit is filed stating sufficient grounds for exclusion of
witnesses, the court has a duty to grant the request.
12. See Coonan v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 25 F. Supp. 834, 835-36 (E.D. Pa. 1938);
Commonwealth v. Turner, 371 Pa. 417, 430, 88 A.2d 915, 921 (1952).
13. See Jaeschke v. Reinders, 2 Mo. App. 212, 215 (St. L. Ct. App. 1876).
Accord, Cone v. Davis, 66 Ga. App. 229, 238, 17 SE.2d 849, 856 (1941); Kopplin
v. Kopplin, 330 Ill. App. 211, 214, 71 N.E.2d 180, 182 (1946); Shew v. Hews, 126 Ind.
474, 476, 26 N.E. 483, 484 (1891); Bernheim v. Dibrell, 66 Miss. 199, 202, 5 So.
693 (1889). Cf. Bryant v. Kansas City Ry., 286 Mo. 342, 355, 228 S.W. 472, 475
(En Banc 1921); Odum v. Corn Products Ref. Co., 173 ElI. App. 348, 352 (1912).
14. U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 18a.
15. 1 S. THOMSON, Tm LAW oF TmLus § 279, at 256 (1889), citing Chester v.
Bower, 55 Cal. 46, 48 (1880); Ryan v. Couch, 66 Ala. 244, 249 (1880). See also
Gross v. Johnson, 248 Ill. App. 531, 534 (1928); French v. Sale, 63 Miss. 386,
391 (1885).
16. 61 Mo. App. 499 (St L. CL App. 1895).
17. Id. at 505.
18. See Chester v. Bower, 55 Cal. 46, 48 (1880); Adolf v. Irby, 110 Tenn. 222,
225-26, 75 S.W. 710, 711 (1923); Southern Ice & Util. Co. v. Richardson, 128 Tex.
82, 85, 95 S.W.2d 956, 958 (Ct. Civ. App. 1936).
19. Goldstein, supra note 8, at 343.
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rule-an attitude which is traceable to the time when parties were first held
competent as witnesses. In that era a prevalent view among judges was that
pre-testimony separation from court was a necessary compensation for the
built-in bias of a party.2 0 While some jurisdictions currently allow exclusion
of parties, the suspicion which originated the practice probably fails to
remain so widespread.
The status of a guardian ad litem as the "alter-ego" of a minor de-
fendant prompted the Keating court to place him on equal footing with
both parties of record and parties in interest with respect to immunity from
the exclusion rule.21 Several Missouri courts have similarly recognized the
importance of the guardian ad litem's representative function during liti-
gation.22 The decisions reveal that he is the vehicle through which the
courts fulfill their duty of jealous protection of infants or incompetent wards
of the court.22 For example, in examining a motion to adjust a guardian
ad litem's fees, the Springfield Court of Appeals, in M.F.A. Mutual Insur-
ance Co. v. Alexander,24 commented that the guardian ad litem's attend-
ance at trial is essential to the defense of a suit and stressed the importance
of his presence in the courtroom as a necessary aid to counsel. In other
words, during the course of litigation the guardian ad litem is to do for
the infant that which the infant would do for himself if legally capable.2 r
In comparing rationales, the same factors which favor exemption for parties
also support immunity of the guardian ad litem from the rule. Further-
more, the guardian ad litem may often fail to possess the inherent bias
of a party.
In Keating v. Jerde, the minor's representive was disqualified as a wit-
ness for his violation of the sequestration rule.2 6 Generally a court has less
discretion in dealing with violators than it has in making the original de-
cision whether to grant the motion.27 Research of Missouri case law indi-
cates that mere failure of the excluded witness to comply with the rule
cannot, by itself, warrant his disqualification.28 In fact, violations which
20. See Randolph v. McCain, 34 Ark. 696, 704 (1879); Missouri, 0. & G. Ry. v.
Hayden, 31 Okla. 21, 119 P. 581 (1911) (court applying Arkansas law); Wisener v.
Maupin, 61 Tenn. (2 Baxt.) 342 (1872).
21. Keating v. Jerde, 472 S.W.2d 651, 655 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971), citing
Larue v. Russell, 26 Ind. 386 (1866); Cottrell v. Cottrell, 81 Ind. 87 (1881); Miller
v. Harpest, 39 Ohio App. 184 (1930).
22. See Tracy v. Martin, 363 Mo. 108, 249 S.W.2d 321 (En Banc 1952); Ken-
nard v. Wiggins, 349 Mo. 283, 160 S.W.2d 706, cert. denied, 317 U.S. 652 (1942);Quincy v. Quincy, 430 S.W.2d 638 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968); M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Alexander, 361 S.W.2d 171 (Spr. Mo. App. 1962).
23. See Spotts v. Spotts, 331 Mo. 917, 55 S.W.2d 977 (1932); Crawford v.
Amusement Syndicate Co., 37 S.W.2d 581 (Mo. 1931); West St. Louis Trust Co.
v. Brokaw, 232 Mo. App. 209, 102 S.W.2d 792 (St. L. Ct. App. 1937).
24. 361 S.W.2d 171 (Spr. Mo. App. 1962).
25. Id. at 181.
26. 472 S.W.2d at 652.
27. Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 16, 25-26 (1967).
28. See State v. Shay, 339 S.W.2d 799 (Mo. 1960); State v. Lord, 286 S.W.2d
737 (Mo. 1956); State v. Compton, 317 Mo. 475, 296 S.W. 137 (1927); State v.
Sloan, 186 S.W. 1002 (Mo. 1916); State v. Fannon, 158 Mo. 149, 59 S.W. 75 (1900);
State v. Sumpter, 153 Mo. 436, 55 S.W. 76 (1900); State v. Gesell, 124 Mo. 531,
27 S.W. 1101 (1894); O'Bryan v. Allen, 95 Mo. 68, 8 S.W. 225 (1888); Keith v.
Wilson, 6 Mo. 435 (1840); Dyer v. Morris, 4 Mo. 214 (1835).
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result merely from a party's negligence may not be sufficient to prevent the
witness from testifying.20 Disqualification is appropriate only when some
element of consent, connivance, or other intentional wrongdoing by the
party accompanies the violation.80 Absent this element the proper remedy
is to punish the witness for contempt,81 along with an attack on his credi-
bility if he takes the stand. 2
In Keating the required degree of connivance or fault on the part of
Mr. Jerde and Linda appeared to be lacking. Assuming arguendo that a
guardian ad litem can be excluded from court, the judge's failure to rule
on the motion may have caused Linda Jerde's counsel to think the motion
had been refused. 3 The situation in Keating may be analagous to instances
where a party is unaware that his witnesses have disobeyed the order, e.g.,
where a witness re-enters the chamber after exclusion and counsel fails to
see the violation3 4 or where a witness arrives too late to hear the order and
sits where the party would not notice him.3s In such cases the party is
virtually without fault, causing many courts to admit the testimony.3 6
Exemption of the guardian ad litem from the exclusion order ap-
pears to be a logical extension of Missouri precedent since both parties
of record and parties in interest were already immune. However, as more
exceptions are carved into the rule, and as judicially defined standards of
discretion evolve, fewer witnesses become subject to exclusion, which se-
verely dilutes the rule's preventive and detective functions. As a solution it
is first suggested that courts not condition the granting of the motion upon
any "show cause" requirement, for often the attorney may have little more
than his intuition as a guideline. Second, for those exempted via some
right or duty to be in court, a compromise measure, used in some jurisdic-
tions, might help reconcile the conflicting notions. One not subject to the
rule can in many situations be given the choice of either testifying before
any of the other witnesses, excluding himself until taking the stand, or not
testifying at all.37 If the exempted witness testifies first he can thereafter
remain in court without danger of his testimony having been fashioned in
relation to the other evidence presented. However, a requirement that de-
29. Brown v. McDaniel, 140 Mo. App. 522, 120 S.W. 642 (St. L. Ct. App.
1909). But see State v. Shay, 339 S.W.2d 799, 802 (Mo. 1960) (court hedged ap-
proval of the rule in Brown v. McDaniel).
30. Cases cited note 28 supra.
31. See State v. Compton, 317 Mo. 475, 296 S.W. 137 (1927); State v. Sloan,
186 S.W. 1002 (Mo. 1916); Keith v. Wilson, 6 Mo. 435 (1840).
32. See Holder v. United States, 150 U.S. 91 (1893); Louisville &c N.R.R. v.
York, 128 Ala. 305, 30 So. 676 (1901).
33. Failure to rule on the motion may also indicate the judge felt exclusion
was a matter of right for the movant, despite Missouri case law to the effect that
sequestration rests in the sound discretion of the court. State v. Compton, 317
Mo. 475, 296 S.W. 137 (1927); Berberet v. Electric Park Amusement Co., 310 Mo.
655, 276 S.W. 36 (1925); Jaeschke v. Reinders, 2 Mo. App. 212 (St. L. Ct. App.
1876).
34. See State v. Shay, 339 S.W.2d 799 (Mo. 1960).
35. Id. at 800-01.
36. Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 16, 82-87 (1967).
37. See Boutelli v. White, 40 Ga. App. 415, 149 S.E. 805 (1929); Burnheim
v. Dibrell, 66 Miss. 109, 5 So. 693 (1889).
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fense witnesses testify at the beginning of trial might seriously impair the
orderly presentation of facts. 8s Nevertheless, the compromise is usually
workable for witnesses on the plaintiff's side of the case, especially the
next friend of a minor plaintiff. To the extent of its workability, this option
may be a step toward fulfillment of the purpose behind sequestration while




OF PARTY OPPONENT'S RIGHT OF INSPECTION
OF WRITINGS USED TO REVIVE
MEMORY IN MISSOURI
State v. Scott'
Jesse Scott was arrested and tried for first degree robbery with a
dangerous and deadly weapon. During his pre-trial hearing, John Billings,
a witness for the state, was allowed, while on the stand, to refer to a certain
paragraph of a police document to revive his memory as to the number
of persons who appeared in a prior identification lineup involving the
defendant.2 The defendant's counsel requested permission to inspect the
police document in its entirety, since it had been used to revive the witness'
memory. The prosecution objected to inspection of the entire document,
and acquiesced only to the inspection of the paragraph which the witness
used. The defendant then moved to suppress Billings' testimony on the
grounds that the defendant was refused the right of inspection of the
entire document. The trial court overruled this motion.
The other prosecution witnesses later testified that, prior to their
appearance in court, they had revived their memories from certain notes
made during an interrogation of the defendant, and that they had failed
to bring the notes with them to court. Defendant's counsel moved to sup-
press their testimony because the defendant had not been allowed to inspect
the notes. The lower court also overruled this motion. After conviction,
defendant appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court, claiming as error
the lower court's rulings on both of his motions to suppress. The supreme
court upheld the lower court's rulings, holding that the defendant was not
entitled to inspect the entire document used to revive memory,3 nor was
the defendant entitled to inspect a document which was used to revive
memory prior to the time the witness took the stand to testify. 4
38. See Wilson v. Peacock, 111 Miss. 116, 71 So. 296 (1916).
1. 467 S.W.2d 851 (Mo. 1971).
2. 1d. at 851-52.
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Generally, in Missouri a witness while testifying is allowed to revive
his memory by use of a document which he made and which he knows
to be correct.5 In turn, the party opponent is entitled to inspection of
the document used by the witness to revive his memory.6 The reason for
this right to inspection is to assure that the document used to revive memory
was of a nature that could revive the witness' memory,7 and also to dis-
courage the use of imposition and false aids in order to give an appearance
of present memory revived. 8 More specifically, when the witness uses writ-
ten aids to supplement his testimony, it creates an impression of reliability
and accuracy which enhances his credibility.9 It is only fair that the party
opponent be permitted to examine those aids in order that he may verify
their accuracy and reliability,10 and bring to the surface any discrepancies
between the witness' testimony and what the document says." Inspection
of the document may also reveal omitted facts which were later related by
the witness at trial, or reveal any difference in emphasis placed upon the
facts as related in the document and by the witness at trial.'2
Scott dealt with two limitations on this general rule: (1) Is a party
opponent entitled to inspect the entire document which is used to revive
the witness' memory? And (2) is a party opponent entitled to inspect a
document which is used to revive the witness' memory at some point prior
to the time the witness takes the stand to testify?
The jurisdictions are split on the issue of whether the party opponent
is entitled to inspect the entire document. Some courts allow inspection
of the entire document used to revive a witness' memory, regardless of
whether its content refers to the subject matter in issue.' 3 The reason for
such a broad inspection rule is to assure fully the accuracy of the parts
of the document used to revive memory, by permitting thorough examina-
tion of the accuracy of the entire document.' 4 Any inaccuracy in the
document, even if totally unrelated to the parts referred to, wil reflect
upon the accuracy of the parts used. 15 However, many jurisdictions do
5. State v. Patton, 255 Mo. 245, 255, 164 S.W. 223, 225 (1914).
6. See, e.g., State v. Gadwood, 342 Mo. 466, 116 S.W.2d 42 (1938); State v.
Tracy, 294 Mo. 372, 243 S.W. 173 (1922); State v. Miller, 234 Mo. 598, 137 S.W.
887 (1911); Traber v. Hicks, 131 Mo. 180, 32 S.W. 1145 (1895); State v. Jackson,
194 S.W. 1078 (K.C. Mo. App. 1917).
7. Green v. State, 53 Tex. Crim. 490, 493, 110 S.W. 920, 921 (1908); C. Mc-
CoR GK, EvrDEacE § 9, at 17 (1954) [hereinafter cited as McCoPnIC].
8. 3 J. WiGmoR, EVmmcE § 762, at 108 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as
WIGMORE].
9. Allen v. State, 243 So. 2d 448, 450 (Fla. App. 1971).
10. Id.
11. The Alpha, 44 F. Supp. 809, 815 (E.D. Pa. 1942).
12. People v. Estrada, 54 Cal. 2d 713, 716, 355 P.2d 641, 642-43, 7 Cal. Rptr.
897, 898 (1960); People v. Chapman, 52 Cal. 2d 95, 98, 338 P.2d 428, 430 (1959).
13. See, e.g., Mosson v. Liberty Fast Freight Co., 124 F.2d 448 (2d Cir.
1942); People v. Bowman, 240 Cal. App. 2d 358, 49 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1966); Allen
v. State, 243 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1971); State v. Peirce, 178 Iowa 417, 159 N.W. 1050
(1916); Moran v. Otis Elevator Co., 291 Mass. 314, 197 N.E. 11 (1935); People v.
Lyons, 49 Mich. 78, 13 N.W. 365 (1882); State v. Deslovers, 40 R.I. 89, 100 A. 64
(1917); State v. Bacon, 41 Vt. 526 (1869); Ossen v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 902,
48 S.E.2d 204 (1948).
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not allow inspection of the entire document.16 Although an early Missouri
case allowed inspection of the entire document,17 the court in Scott dearly
adopts the view that the entire document need not be made available for
inspection.' s
Among the jurisdictions which do not allow inspection of the entire
document, there is division as to the extent of inspection that will be al-
lowed. Some courts hold that the party opponent may only inspect the par-
ticular parts of the document which the witness used to revive his memory.19
It has been contended, however, that this view has the effect of inducing un-
ethical use of the documents to revive memory, because portions of the
document may be taken out of their original context by the party offering
them.20 This tends to defeat the purposes for allowing inspection.2 ' How-
ever, this view eliminates attempts by the party opponent to "fish" for in-
formation which would not otherwise be attainable under the normal rules
of discovery.
Other courts follow the view that a party opponent may inspect the
parts specifically referred to as well as any other parts of the document
which are within the same context or deal with the same subject matter.2 2
This view prevents "fishing expeditions" for information by the party op-
ponent. It also prevents the danger that the part of the document used to re-
vive memory will be taken out of context.23 However, this view does not
allow for a check on the accuracy of the part of the document used by the
witness by allowing inspection of the entire document for its overall ac-
curacy. This view also presents the practical problem of how to determine
which parts of the document, other than those specifically referred to, are
within the same context or deal with the same subject matter. The federal
law, which allows a similar rule as to the extent of inspection,24 suggests one
16. See Annots., 82 A.L.R.2d 473, 572-73 (1962), 125 A.L.R. 19, 204-06 (1940),
22 L.R.A. (n.s.) 706, 707 (1909), for cases applying this rule.
17. State v. Nardini, 186 S.W. 557 (K.C. Mo. App. 1916).
18. 467 S.W.2d at 853. See also State v. Johnson, 454 S.W.2d 27, 30 (Mo.
1970).
19. See, e.g., Engle v. Stull, 377 F.2d 930 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United States v.
Easterday, 57 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1932); Smith v. Smith, 222 Ga. 318, 149 S.E.2d 683(1966); Commonwealth v. Ponzi, 256 Mass. 159, 152 N.E. 807 (1926); Jewett v.
Boston Elevated R.R., 219 Mass. 528, 107 N.E. 433 (1914); Leach v. State, 220
Tenn. 526, 420 S.W.2d 641 (1967).
20. Moran v. Otis Elevator Co., 291 Mass. 314, 319, 197 N.E. 11, 13 (1935).
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Brownlow v. United States, 8 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1925); Parks v.
Biebel, 18 Colo. App. 12, 69 P. 273 (1902); Bendett v. Bendett, 315 Mass. 59, 52
N.E.2d 2 (1943); Commonwealth v. Haley, 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 587 (1866); Morrow
v. State, 56 Tex. Crim. 519, 120 S.W. 491 (1909); 3 WiGmopm § 762, at 111.
23. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
24. However, under federal statute, inspection in criminal cases is not limited
to only documents used to revive memory. It grants the party opponent the right
to inspect all statements made by a witness for the United States, after he has
testified, which relate to the subject matter about which he testified. Witnesses and
Evidence Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970).
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answer to this problem. The "Jencks Act,"25 which partially embodied the
principles set forth in Jencks v. United States,26 provides in section 3500 (c):
[T]he court shall order the United States to deliver such state-
ment for the inspection of the court in camera. Upon such deliv-
ery the court shall excise the portions of such statement which do
not relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness.
With such material excised, the court shall then direct delivery of
such statement to the defendant for his use.2 7
A similar procedure could be instituted in those jurisdictions which follow
the rule which allows examination of parts referred to or within the same
context.
It is not entirely settled as to whether Missouri has adopted the ap-
proach that only the particular parts of the document which are specifically
referred to by the witness may be inspected, or the view that the opponent
may inspect the parts referred to as well as any other parts of the document
which are within the same context or deal with the same subject matter.
In Scott, there is some support for the proposition that Missouri adopts the
former view. The court states:
[T]he court offered to allow appellant's counsel to see that portion
of the document containing the paragraph which the witness read
to refresh his memory.... In view of the fact that other portions
of the document were not used by the witness Billings to refresh
his recollection, there was no error in the court's ruling.28
This language tends to reflect the idea that the party opponent may only
inspect as a matter of right the portions of the document which are specif-
ically used by the witness to revive his memory. However, a broad read-
ing of Scott might permit the alternative interpretation that the party
opponent may not only inspect portions actually referred to but also those
portions in the same context. The court's language indicates that it might
have been more concerned about disapproving an apparent attempt by
defendant's counsel to conduct a "fishing expedition," than about formu-
lating a hard and fast rule as to the scope of the inspection right. The
court emphasizes that the document was used only once, and then only to a
limited extent; that the validity of the answer given by the witness was not
questioned by the party opponent; and that the subject matter of the re-
sponse was never really at issue in the case. It was said, therefore, that the
defendant could not have been prejudiced by it in any event by being de-
nied inspection of the document.2 9 Because the party opponent never
raised the possibility that the portion used to refresh the witness' memory
might have been taken out of context, the court never addressed itself
25. Id. See Annot., 5 L.Ed.2d 1014 (1961), for an examination of validity
and construction of the Act, and Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 763 (1966), for application of
the Act.
26. 358 U.S. 657 (1957).
27. Witnesses and Evidence Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (c) (1970).
28. 467 S.W.2d at 852-58.
29. Id. at 853.
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directly to the validity of this contention as grounds for broader examina-
tion.80
The second issue in Scott was whether a document used to revive the
memory of a witness before he takes the stand may be inspected by the
party opponent as a matter of right. Again, the jurisdictions are split. Some
courts limit inspection by the party opponent to the situation where the
document is used to revive the witness' memory while he is on the stand
testifying.8 1 This view prevents "fishing expeditions" by an unscrupulous
opponent to obtain information he would otherwise be unable to discover.32
It also prevents the danger that the opponent would use his right of in-
spection as a dilatory tactic, by demanding to be allowed to examine every
memoranda used by every witness in preparation for trial.3 3 Finally, it
prevents exclusion of otherwise valid testimony on a basis that a witness
cannot produce a writing to which he once referred, without regard to how
long ago he referred to it or why he is unable to produce it.84
However, there are certain disadvantages to this no-inspection rule.
The same evils which attend use of the document to revive memory on the
stand also attend the use of the document to revive memory out of court.8 5
Also the rule encourages attorneys to revive the memory of their witnesses
out of court to avoid inspection, thereby making it difficult to determine the
manner or extent of the refreshing of the witnesses' memory, and thus mak-
ing it difficult for the jury to weigh the credence which should be given to
the witnesses' testimony.8 6 Some proponents of the non-inspection rule have
argued that it is necessary to prevent "fishing expeditions" by the party
opponent. Some courts have met this contention by pointing out that such
an approach loses sight of the very purpose of a criminal trial, the ascer-
tainment of all the facts.87
Other courts allow inspection of a document used to revive memory
regardless of whether it was used at some point in time before the witness
testifies or on the stand while he is testifying.8 This view prevents misuse
30. See id. at 851-52. The defendant's only request at the pretrial hearing was
to see the "entire document."
31. See, e.g., Echert v. United States, 188 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1951); United
States v. Cohen, 148 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 852 (1945); United
States v. Toner, 77 F. Supp. 908, (E.D. Pa. 1948), revd on other grounds, 173 F.2d
140 (3d Cir. 1949); Williams v. State, 208 So. 2d 628 (Fla. App. 1968); Rose v. B.L.
Cartage Co., 110 Ill. App. 2d 260, 249 N.E.2d 199 (1969); Leonard v. Taylor, 315
Mass. 580, 53 N.E.2d 705 (1944); Winters v. Winters, 282 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1955); State v. Paschall, 182 Wash. 304, 47 P.2d 15 (1935).
32. Leonard v. Taylor, 315 Mass. 580, 583, 53 N.E.2d 705, 707 (1944).
33. 41 CALiF. L. Rr-v. 753 (1953).
34. 1 U.C.L.A. L. Rr'v. 108, 109-10 (1953).
35. People v. Scott, 29 III. 2d 97, 111, 193 N.E.2d 814, 821-22 (1963); McCoR-
mcK § 9, at 17; 3 WiGMoRE § 762, at 111.
36. Comment, Witnesses; Examination Of-Use of Memoranda, 18 OaR. L.
REv. 136, 145 (1939).
37. People v. Silberstein, 159 Cal. App. 2d 848, 851, 323 P.2d 591, 593 (Super.
Ct. 1958).
38. See, e.g., People v. Estrada, 54 Cal. 2d 713, 355 P.2d 641, 7 Cal. Rptr. 897(1960); People v. Silberstein, 159 Cal. App. 2d 848, 323 P.2d 591 (Super. Ct. 1958);
People v. Hartgraves, 31 111. 2d 375, 202 N.E.2d 33, cert. denied, 380 U.S.
96 (1964); People v. Scott, 29 III. 2d 97, 193 N.E.2d 814 (1963); State v. Hunt, 25
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of these documents both in and out of court.39 However, as previously men-
tioned, such a rule may allow "fishing expeditions" 4 0 and dilatory tactics.41
In Scott, the court reiterates Missouri's position by following the former
view; inspection is allowable only if the witness' memory is revived while
he was on the stand.42
In the final analysis, Scott makes it clear that Missouri will not allow
a party opponent to inspect documents used to revive a witness' memory
unless this was accomplished while the witness was testifying, and even then
he does not have the right to inspect the entire document, where only part
of the document was used to revive memory. However, the court does not
deal directly with whether the party opponent will be permitted to see only
those portions of the document which the witness specifically used to revive
his memory, or whether he will be permitted to see the portions specifically
referred to by the witness as well as other portions of the document within
the same context or dealing with the same subject matter. Although the
language in Scott leans toward the former interpretation, it will take an-
other case, where the court is squarely faced with this question, before the
issue will clearly be resolved.
DONALD E. WooDY
N.J. 514, 138 A.2d 1 (1958); State v. Mucci, 25 N.J. 423, 136 A.2d 761 (1957); State
v. Bradshaw, 101 R.I. 233, 221 A.2d 815 (1966); State v. Deslovers, 40 R.I. 89, 100
A. 64 (1917).
39. Authorities cited note 35 supra.
40. Leonard v. Taylor, 315 Mass. 580, 583, 53 N.E.2d 705, 707 (1944).
41. Note, supra note 33, at 753.
42. See State v. Smith, 431 S.W.2d 74, 82 (Mo. 1968); State v. Aubuchon, 381
S.W.2d 807, 814 (Mo. 1964); State v. Miller, 368 S.W.2d 353, 357 (Mo. 1963); State
v. Crayton, 354 S.W.2d 834, 838 (Mo. 1962); State v. Gadwood, 342 Mo. 466, 483,
116 S.W.2d 42, 51 (1937); Bova v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 316 S.W.2d 140, 146
(St. L. Mo. App. 1958).
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